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I. INTRODUCTION
Larry Laudan’s recent work, including his most recent book,1 previous
articles,2 and now his article and presentation for this Symposium,3 give us
cause to reflect on the fundamental goals of the criminal justice system, and
on whether our institutions, and the research surrounding them, are raising
the right questions and resolving them in the most accurate and effective
ways.4 For Professor Laudan, the primary purpose of the criminal justice
system is to minimize harm—whether harm committed by the state against
innocent individuals (conviction of the innocent—the problem of false
positives), or harm caused by individuals engaging in crime (which is
exacerbated by what he calls false acquittals, or the false negative problem).5
For too long, he argues, commentators and the system itself have focused too
much on the former, to the neglect of the latter.
1

See generally LARRY LAUDAN, THE LAW’S FLAWS: RETHINKING TRIAL AND ERRORS?
(2016).
2
E.g., Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 65
(2008); Larry Laudan, Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, 9 LEGAL THEORY 295 (2003).
3
Larry Laudan, Different Strokes for Different Folks: Fixing the Error Patterns in
Criminal Prosecutions by “Empiricizing” the Rules of Criminal Law and Taking False
Acquittals Seriously, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1243 (2018).
4
A theme that runs through much of Professor Laudan’s work on these issues it that the
criminal justice system, like any form of empirical inquiry, should be concerned about
gathering and assessing data on the system’s failure rates—the rates at which it produces both
false positive (false convictions) and false negatives (what he calls false acquittals). No doubt
such data would be valuable. But as I discuss in greater detail infra, Part III, Professor Laudan
overlooks that assessing those rates requires access to ground truth, or a gold standard test of
reliability or accuracy—something that simply is not available in the vast majority of criminal
cases. Unfortunately, in place of real data—which is realistically unattainable—Professor
Laudan builds mathematical formulas for assessing the system and its structures upon error
rates that are little more than guesses and assumptions—and quite debatable ones at that, as
we shall see.
5
It is debatable whether the notion of a “false acquittal” even makes sense, as either an
epistemological or a legal matter. That is because we never can know why a jury acquits any
individual. Sometimes, it might be because the defendant is in some absolute sense guilty,
but the jury cannot discern it, at least not beyond a reasonable doubt (itself a proper judgment,
but one Professor Laudan would consider factually erroneous). Note, however, that we have
no way of gauging or assessing that (unlike in exonerations cases, where new evidence is used
to establish innocence). In other instances, however, the jury might acquit because, although
convinced beyond any real doubt of guilt, the jury is expressing some other value or purpose—
to punish the prosecutor, to act as a check on what jurors may see as a runaway government,
and / or to reflect a community’s sense that the law at issue is unjust. While Professor Laudan
might count those as false acquittals, in our constitutional system, the jury exists precisely to
exercise that sort of community control over the government, which cannot truly be
considered an error or a false acquittal. As Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel observed in their
1966 study of the American jury, “The jury, it is said, is a remarkable device for insuring that
we are governed by the spirit of the law and not by its letter; for insuring that rigidity of any
general rule of law can be shaped to justice in the particular case.” HARRY KALVEN & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8–9 (1971). I return to this point infra, at text accompanying
footnotes 65–67.
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Throughout much of Professor Laudan’s work on these topics, his
arguments follow a similar pattern and reach a similar conclusion. That
argument, presented here in very simplified form, is as follows. First, to
assess the appropriate procedural rules and burdens of proof in criminal
cases, he contends, we need to understand empirically the costs of both false
negatives and false positives. He then extrapolates from admittedly meager
data what he believes are the false positive and false negative error rates in
the criminal justice system, and concludes that false acquittals are a much
bigger problem than false convictions. His prescription is a rather startling
call to incarcerate many more people, and for much longer than we currently
do, at least for violent crimes.6
Professor Laudan’s method for increasing our incarceration levels is
equally unsettling: he urges us to rejigger the system to increase convictions
in ways that he acknowledges will also cause an increase in convictions of
the innocent. His most prominent call is to abandon the reasonable doubt
standard, at least for repeat violent offenders. To support this claim,
Professor Laudan argues that each false acquittal for a violent crime7 causes
1.2 harms because on average, individuals who have committed a violent
crime will commit 1.2 more violent crimes.8 On the other side of the ledger,
Professor Laudan argues that false convictions (false positives) cause
approximately 2.2 harms each—1 harm to the wrongly convicted individual
plus the 1.2 crimes that the true perpetrator who is not apprehended will
commit.9 From this, Professor Laudan argues, the true comparative cost of
false convictions to false acquittals is 2.2 to 1.2, or roughly 2 to 1.10
Professor Laudan then contends that the rules of evidence and criminal
procedure overwhelmingly and inappropriately favor defendants and, in
particular, that the proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard (which he
refers to by the acronym “BARD”)11 is out of alignment with these
comparative costs. He contends that we currently acquit far more guilty
people than we convict innocents, so that we need to recalibrate the equation
in ways that make the ratio of false acquittals to false convictions closer to
what he contends is his empirically derived 2 to 1 ratio.

6

See infra text accompanying notes 207–08.
Professor Laudan generally limits his argument to violent crimes. LAUDAN, supra note
1, at 1245.
8
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 1253.
9
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 1253.
10
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 1253.
11
I do not find the BARD acronym helpful, so I generally refer to the standard as the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” or simply the “reasonable doubt” standard, except when quoting
for Professor Laudan, where I quote the acronym “BARD” as he uses it.
7
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Professor Laudan’s primary complaint is with the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard. He argues that, given the true value of comparative harms,
the burden should be a much lower one, more consistent with the “clear and
convincing” standard. In his current article, he refines this claim a bit,
arguing for a sliding scale burden of proof that is dependent on the accused’s
prior record. He contends that, because individuals with prior records are
much more likely to recidivate than are first-time offenders, the clear-andconvincing standard should be applicable to repeat offenders, while firsttimers can still be tried under the reasonable doubt standard.12
In this response, I address some of Professor Laudan’s claims, and the
assumptions and data underlying them. In Part II, I take on some of Professor
Laudan’s claims about the nature, purpose, and effects of the reasonable
doubt standard. I contend that neither is the standard the culprit he thinks it
is in creating injustice, nor does it create the type of formal mathematical,
probabilistic assessment of evidence that he assumes it does. In Part III, I
point out the difficulty—indeed the impossibility—of accurately assessing
the real rate of either false negatives or false positives in the criminal justice
system, and hence the futility of Professor Laudan’s enterprise. In Part IV,
I add to that conclusion by challenging his attempts to meaningfully quantify
the harms from both false convictions and false acquittals, and his
conclusions about the comparative harms from each. Part V then examines
Professor Laudan’s claims about the various ways that the system currently
is skewed to (overly) protect criminal defendants, including guilty ones. I
show that, in many respects, Professor Laudan has the analysis exactly
backwards—and in the ways that count most for determining the disputed
facts. I also challenge his prescription for reforms that would ratchet up mass
incarceration rates, disproportionately harm low-income and minority
people, and sweep even more innocent people into prison, all in his quest to
convict and imprison more of the guilty. Finally, in Part VI, I contend that
because the mathematized weighing and apportioning of harms that
Professor Laudan undertakes is a doomed enterprise with enormous
unacceptable costs, the reform agenda—whether one cares more about crime
prevention or innocence protection—ought to be to look first for ways to
reform the system to improve its overall diagnosticity, and to simultaneously
reduce both false negatives and false positives, without the flawed
assumption that the two are always and inevitably in tension. I show how
this, indeed, is the primary thrust of the Innocence Movement.

12

Laudan, supra note 3, at 1251.
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II. PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
Professor Laudan’s work, at its core, repeatedly challenges our
adherence to the reasonable doubt standard. He argues that we should
seriously doubt “[t]he belief that the two-century old standard of proof
(‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’) must not be changed because it is
required by the Constitution and because it alone protects the innocent. Both
claims are patently false.”13 I have neither the space nor the inclination to
debate here the constitutional roots of the reasonable doubt standard,
especially because it is so thoroughly entrenched in constitutional doctrine
that it is inconceivable the courts will abandon it any time soon.14 But I will
briefly address some of Professor Laudan’s related contentions.
A. Definitional Challenges
Professor Laudan’s first attack on the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard is that it defies definition.15 It is not quite accurate, however, to say
that “beyond a reasonable doubt” lacks definition. As Jules Epstein points
out, courts routinely define “beyond a reasonable doubt” through standard
jury instructions.16 To be sure, various courts have used different wording
to define the standard, and courts and critics alike have bemoaned the
difficulty in providing a clear definition. But these indictments provide a
weak basis for abandoning the standard—which in its essence expresses the
fundamental value that we need to be very sure about guilt before we permit
the state to impose draconian sanctions depriving individuals of life, liberty,
or property as punishment for perceived misdeeds.
On its merits, Professor Laudan’s ambiguity argument tells us little
about how to apportion error in criminal cases, in part because it says little
about how any other standard would work better. With the reasonable doubt
standard there should be little confusion about what is meant by “doubt,” so
Professor Laudan’s (and other critics’) concern must be with the modifier
“reasonable.” But “reasonable” or “reasonableness” is a term that is
ubiquitous in the law; from the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
“unreasonable” searches and seizures to the standard of care that defines
negligence in tort law, to all of the various tests that rely upon some form of
13

LAUDAN, supra note 1, at ix.
In this regard, I am in complete agreement with Paul Cassell’s analysis of the
unconstitutionality of Professor Laudan’s proposal. Paul G. Cassell, Risking Wrongful
Convictions: Quantifying the Risk, Addressing the Risk, and Escaping the Risk, 48 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1435 (2018).
15
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at ix, 4.
16
See Jules Epstein, The National Commission on Forensic Science: Impactful or
Ineffectual?, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 743, 770 (2018) (quoting U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3.06 (2011), http://www.ca3.usco
urts.gov/sites/ca3/files/Chapter%203%20Rev%20April%202015.pdf).
14
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the “reasonable person” test. If the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is
unsustainable because it depends on the inherently intuitive notion of
“reasonableness,” then the law as a whole is in serious trouble. In the end,
Professor Laudan’s own solution exposes the emptiness of this criticism of
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Professor Laudan ultimately
advocates for a “clear and convincing” standard in some criminal cases, but
never explains how that solves his clarity problem. There is indeed nothing
intrinsically clearer about “clear and convincing” than there is about
“reasonable doubt,” and Professor Laudan points to nothing providing the
clarity he asserts we need.
B. Overclaiming About Reasonable Doubt
To his credit, Professor Laudan does not really hang his argument on
concerns about the difficulty in defining “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Rather, he argues that what is more important is that “we should . . . look at
[BARD’s] results; that is, how often do erroneous verdicts occur at trial and
in pleas and how often can those errors be attributed to BARD? And, we
need to ask, what is the optimal error ratio—that ratio that will produce the
fewest harms to innocent victims.”17
But even with that focus on producing the least harm to innocent
victims, Professor Laudan’s near single-minded focus on the reasonable
doubt standard is puzzling. He alleges that supporters of the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard claim that “it alone protects the innocent”18 and
that it is “the most important rule governing the conduct of criminal trials.”19
Certainly the standard is important—even fundamental—but to single it out
as the key or sole feature of the system for determining the prevalence and
distribution of errors reveals an odd, unjustified fixation. The system is far
more complex than that and, in the end, the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard, as important as it is, is implemented through a jury instruction,
which jurors may or may not follow with fidelity. It does nothing to affect
the production, access to, and presentation of evidence, which likely
represent much more significant variables in determining both the
prevalence and distribution of error.
Professor Laudan nonetheless asserts that “the overwhelming reason
for most false negatives is not a flawed case made by the prosecutor nor a
lack of strong inculpatory evidence but the fact that, to convict someone of
a crime, our system generally requires that the jury must be unanimously
persuaded of his guilt to a degree of near certainty (proof beyond a

17
18
19

Laudan, supra note 3 (emphasis in original).
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at ix.
LAUDAN, supra note 1.
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reasonable doubt).”20 Yet, despite his plea for empirical evidence and data
to assess the workings of the criminal justice system, Professor Laudan
provides no data or evidence to support this claim—he just asserts it as true.
C. Mathematizing Proof or Expressing Values?
Much of Professor Laudan’s claim about the power of the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard appears to rest on his penchant for treating factfinding as a mathematical process of apportioning discernible probabilities.
He assumes, for example, that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
translates in jurors’ minds as something akin to 90% certainty or more. From
this, Professor Laudan makes the remarkable assertion that “all arrestees
with a likelihood of guilt of 80% or 70% are almost certain to win an
acquittal, even though the numbers tell us that it quite likely that they
committed the crime.”21 While that might be true if adjudication were a
mathematical proposition working with known likelihoods, that it is of
course not at all how it actually works.22 Nor should it be.23 The process is
far too nuanced, value-laden, and emotion-driven to be reduced to such neat
formulaic expressions. Professor Laudan tells us nothing about how jurors
in the real world come up with, as Michael Risinger puts it, “credible
numbers to mathematize what is meant by standards of proof.”24
20

LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 13.
Laudan, supra note 3, at 1245.
22
Susan Haack, for example, has explained that “probabilistic conceptions of degrees of
proof . . . are fatally flawed,” because “degrees of epistemic warrant simply don’t conform to
the axioms of standard mathematical calculus of probabilities; from which it follows that
degrees of proof cannot plausibly be constructed probabilistically.” SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE
MATTERS: SCIENCE, PROOF, AND TRUTH IN THE LAW xvii–xviii (2014). See also id. at 18–19,
61–62. She elaborates: “[W]e can’t look to probability theory for an understanding of degrees
and standards of proof in the law, but must look, instead, to an older and less formal branch
of inquiry: epistemology.” Id. at 47. Lawrence Tribe has likewise observed that “the lay trier
will surely find it difficult at best, and sometimes impossible, to attach to P(X) a number that
correctly represents his real prior assessment. Few laymen have had experience with the
assignment of probabilities, and it might end up being a matter of pure chance whether a
particular juror converts his mental state of partial certainty to a figure like .33, .43, or
somewhere in between.” Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in
the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1358 (1971).
23
Tribe, for example, has pointed out that, if we were to mathematize evidential
probabilities at trials, one effect would be “the dwarfing of soft variables”—facts that are
easily quantifiable will be counted, and those that cannot will be disregarded or minimized,
leading to outcomes in which, “despite what turns out to be a spurious appearance of accuracy
and completeness, is likely to be significantly warped and hence highly suspect.” Tribe, supra
note 22, at 1361–62. Accordingly, as Haack concludes, “it isn’t feasible to put precise
numbers on degrees of proof; nor would it necessarily be desirable to do so even if we could.”
HAACK, supra note 22, at 59.
24
D. Michael Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply That We
Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 965
(2018) [hereinafter Risinger, Leveraging Surprise].
21
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Professor Risinger and others have, on several occasions, offered more
compelling accounts of how the reasonable doubt standard works—not as a
mathematical or formal probabilistic assessment,25 but more as a value
statement about the importance of the decision the jurors are being called
upon to make.
The term “beyond a reasonable doubt” . . . forces the individual
juror to ponder the question of how the law wants him to decide,
and to examine his own soul, so to speak, to answer the question
of whether or not he is as sure as the law requires him to be. It is
intended to make even the juror who thinks that the defendant “did
it,” in everyday terms, think twice.26
In this Symposium, Professor Risinger develops this thought further in a farmore sophisticated argument than I can approximate here. He argues that
standards of proof “are not properly seen as statements entailing or implying
any formal version of modern mathematized probability theory or statistical
theory,” but rather as “degrees of belief” measured by “the intensity of the
surprise that would be experienced if it were established that the proposition
believed to be true is in fact false. Professor Risinger’s “central claim is that
people believe something to be true to the extent that they would be surprised
to find out it was false.”27
Indeed, prominent schools of thought about the trial process today, such
as the narrative theory of the trial, the story model, or the relative plausibility
theory, all posit that the side that wins—even in a criminal case—is the side
that tells the story that best fits with the evidence presented. It is a process
driven not so much by mathematical likelihoods of guilt as it is by
comparative strength of competing narratives.28 Contrary to Professor
25

Id. at 973 (“I am of the school that thinks that attempts at formalizing the meaning of
burdens through the use of numerical expressions of probability is probably a bad idea in
theory and definitely a bad idea in practice. Formal mathematization can have all sorts of
unintended consequences.”).
26
Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due
Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 199 (1969).
27
Risinger, Leveraging Surprise, supra note 24, at 973. Risinger elaborates: “But how
do we measure these levels of surprise, or at any rate induce jurors to measure them in
themselves? Not by artificially generated cardinal numbers to put into a full probability
calculus, but by a well-ordered system of categories designated by words like what are now
called (rather unfortunately, I now believe) “words of estimative probability.” In fact, the
traditional three standards of proof of our litigation system are a rank-ordered, three-category
system defined by various formulas, which can be thought of as words (or word formulas) of
estimative probability. But what I propose is a system which uses what I would prefer to call
“words of estimative surprise,” such as mildly surprised, surprised, quite surprised, greatly
surprised, astonished, shocked, etc. Id. at 981 (footnotes omitted).
28
See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in
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Laudan’s artificially mathematized world, under the narrative theory of the
trial, the defendant whom Professor Laudan somehow assesses to be 70%80% likely to be guilty might indeed be convicted, under the narrative theory
of the trial because the guilt narrative is the one that might appear far more
compelling. Or in Professor Risinger’s terms, the jury that considers the
competing evidence in such a case might be quite surprised, even shocked,
to learn that the accused was in fact innocent.29
In the end, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is based
on something more fundamental, but less quantifiable, than Professor
Laudan’s algorithm assumes. Even if we could somehow assign a
mathematical weight to the harms that individuals suffer from the effects of
wrongful conviction and the effects of being victimized by a recidivist who
was mistakenly acquitted of a prior offense, that still would not justify
modeling a burden of proof based on those weights. That is because the
burden of proof—the requirement that the state prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt—and indeed, Blackstone’s ratio (the well-known maxim
that it is “better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent
suffer”30)—are not premised not on some illusion of mathematical precision,
or on some notion that the harms caused to victims of all sorts can be
meaningfully assessed and weighed.31 They are instead based, at least in
significant part, on the notion that, whatever suffering the victimization may
cause, it is far worse as a structural matter in a free society for the government
to actively and deliberately deprive its citizens of life, liberty, or the ability
to lead the life they choose, than it is for a private individual, through
criminal misdeeds, to harm another and to escape punishment. Several years
ago, Professor Risinger also made this point, in response to a similar proposal
made by Professors Laudan and Ronald Allen:
INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192 (Reid Hastie ed.,
1993); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281 (2013); Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the
Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 189 (1992)..
28
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358 (1765).
29
Risinger, Leveraging Surprise, supra note 24, at 973.
30
Id.
31
Relatedly, Professor Laudan has a curious penchant for treating the Blackstone ratio
as if it were meant to express a precise mathematical weighing of the costs of false convictions
and false acquittals. Others have persuasively explained that the Blackstone ratio was never
meant to express a precise mathematical formula, but rather a more general sense of values,
so I will not repeat those arguments here. See, e.g., Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error
in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2015); D. Michael Risinger, Tragic
Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to Allen and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L.
REV. 991, 1002 (2010) [hereinafter Risinger, Tragic Consequences]; Marvin Zalman, The
Anti-Blackstonians, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1319 (2018).
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Viewing the state as having more responsibility for harm done
directly to the immediate subjects of its acts than for the harm
done indirectly by its failures to act, or by its choices to act one
way rather than another, has a long tradition, especially in
situations where the latter harm is done by the subsequent choice
of an independent human agent.32
The reasonable doubt standard, therefore, reflects the notion that, when
the state acts directly to inflict massive punitive harm on an individual, it
must be constrained to act in only the clearest and most compelling of
cases.33 As Michael Corrado has written recently in comparing the civil
burden of a preponderance of the evidence to the criminal burden of beyond
a reasonable doubt:
When all that is at issue is the allocation of a loss that can be
measured in financial terms, the accuser needs only to prove the
defendant’s fault by a preponderance of the evidence, but where
the defendant’s very life or freedom is at stake the burden is
considerably higher: the prosecutor must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. In the criminal case the community has placed
the high burden upon the state because the imposition of
punishment by the state is such a terrifying act.34

32

Risinger, Tragic Consequences, supra note 31, at 1020 (footnote omitted). For this
point, Professor Risinger draws, in part, on writings of the nineteenth-century reformist Sir
Samuel Romilly, who famously observed, “When, therefore, the guilty escape, the Law has
merely failed. . . . But when the innocent become the victims of the Law . . . it creates the
very evil it was to cure, and destroys the security it was made to preserve.” Id. at 998 n.24
(quoting SIR SAMUEL ROMILLY, Observations on the Criminal Law as It Relates to Capital
Punishments, and on the Mode in Which It Is Administered, in 1 THE SPEECHES OF SIR SAMUEL
ROMILLY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 106, 165–66 (1820)). Professor Risinger wrote in
response to arguments propounded in Allen & Laudan’s article, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note
2.
33
Professor Cassell, in his contribution to this Symposium, acknowledges this argument
but ultimately rejects it as unpersuasive because, he contends, in modern society providing
security against crime has become a “special responsibility” of the government, just as is its
obligation to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction. See Cassell, supra note 14, at
1444. It is no doubt true that the government has responsibility for providing security against
crime and also restraining itself to avoid directly inflicting criminal punishments on the
innocent. Professor Cassell’s argument, however, tells us nothing about how to weigh failure
to meet either of those responsibilities. Cassell, supra note 14, at 1444. I suggest that, even
acknowledging Professor Casssell’s point, the government’s first obligation is to avoid
directly inflicting harm on its people, just like a physician, who has a special responsibility
for providing care to her patients, bears a primary and overriding obligation to “do no harm.”
34
Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Burden of Proof 1 (U.N.C. Legal Studies
Research Paper 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2997654.
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Professor Laudan’s quantification simply fails to capture the real essence of
the reasonable doubt standard.
III.

MAKING ERRORS COUNTING ERRORS

A. Verdict Errors
To justify his assault on the reasonable doubt standard, Professor
Laudan attempts to measure what he believes are the harms produced by that
standard. To start, Professor Laudan takes legal actors and scholars to task
for failing to figure out how often criminal justice processes produce
inaccurate results—both false positives and false negatives. “Such
ignorance,” he says, “speaks not only to an intellectual and moral laxness but
also to the abandonment of the cardinal rule of any self-respecting system of
empirical inquiry, to wit, devising and then utilizing methods to figure out
how often its results are reliable.”35 But it is not quite that simple because
the reality is that there is no good method for counting criminal justice
system errors. After all, the processes are themselves the best we have been
able to come up with for figuring out what happened in a contested historical
event. The trial (or short of that, the plea) is itself the closest we have to a
gold standard for determining truth. Unlike most scientific methods of
empirical inquiry, which have true gold standard diagnostic tools (e.g., blood
tests as a check on the reliability of clinical judgment for many illnesses) or
the ability to set up randomized controlled studies, the law usually has
nothing more than the outcomes of the individual cases themselves.36 Only
in the exoneration context do we sometimes have the ability to discover error,
through the production of new evidence of innocence (especially DNA
evidence). This tells us that error does occur, and does so at above a trivial
level, which can help us understand the conditions and contributing factors
that can lead to false positives. It cannot, however, tell us a rate. For false
negatives (false acquittals), as discussed below, we do not even have that.
1. Problems with Counting False Positives
Despite Professor Laudan’s criticism, scholars have attempted to
estimate wrongful conviction rates, relying primarily on examining discrete
cohorts of wrongful convictions. But even those scholars have noted that
their estimates are rough, or reflective of only discrete subcategories of
convictions, which cannot easily be extrapolated across the criminal justice
system more broadly. Professor Laudan himself relies upon—and accepts
35

LAUDAN, supra note 1, at xiii.
Indeed, examples that Professor Laudan explicitly relies upon include error rates for
medical tests and public opinion polls, both of which usually can be measured ultimately
against ground truth. LAUDAN, supra note 1, at xiv.
36

FINDLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

1276

8/10/2018 9:44 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1265

as a true value—an average of several of those estimates (although he rounds
the estimated error rate downward to 3%),37 including one based upon an
analysis of wrongful convictions in capital rape murder cases by Michael
Risinger, which estimated an error rate of 3.3%-5%.38 But Professor Laudan
ignores Professor Risinger’s own caution against attempting to generalize
from the rate of wrongful convictions applicable to all crimes and all
jurisdictions. Professor Risinger cautions that such extrapolation cannot be
done because “the universe of criminal convictions is almost certainly
heavily substructured in regard to factual innocence rates.”39 This
substructuring, Professor Risinger notes, combined with limited access to
reliable information about wrongful conviction rates for most types of cases,
“renders virtually useless any notion of a system-wide ‘wrongful conviction
rate.’”40 Professor Risinger adds, “[t]here are two reasons why we should
resist the temptation to expend much effort in pondering such a general
average factual wrongful conviction rate: first, we are unlikely to ever be
able to derive it very specifically, and, second, it would not tell us anything
very important if we knew it.”41
2. Problems with Counting False Negatives
The foundation for Professor Laudan’s mathematized analysis is further
undermined because, as Professor Laudan’s indictment of the scholarship
notes, far less is known about false acquittals, or more broadly, false
negatives. Given constitutional constraints, there are virtually no cases in
which an acquitted individual has been later proven guilty based on new and
better evidence, so there is almost no data. Professor Laudan laments this as
a moral failing of criminal justice actors and observers, rather than as a
reality of the inaccessibility of ground truth: “An erroneous acquittal will
almost always escape detection, not because it would be especially difficult
to identify false acquittals if we earnestly looked for them but because almost
no one gives a damn about their occurrence.”42

37

See LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 54 (citing Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the
United States, 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 n.21 (2005); KALVEN
& ZEISEL, supra note 5; Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal
Defendants Who are Sentenced to Death, 111 PNAS 7230 (2014), http://www.pnas.org/conte
nt/111/20/7230.full.pdf; D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirical Justified
Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007) [hereinafter
Risinger, Innocents Convicted].
38
Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra note 37, at 761.
39
Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra note 37, at 783.
40
Risinger, Tragic Consequences, supra note 31, at 991, 993–97.
41
Risinger, Innocents Convicted, supra note 37, at 782.
42
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 10.
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Professor Laudan is correct that the data are not there, but it is not
because of disinterest. Rather, data about false negatives that is reliable and
meaningful is nearly impossible to obtain—a reality that Professor Laudan
cannot accept because it dooms his enterprise. On the other side of the
equation, discovering a single false conviction case requires enormous
resources, access to evidence, dogged resolve, skilled lawyers, enormous
luck, and a long time (an average of nine to fourteen years).43 Professor
Laudan never tells us how anything approximating that could be undertaken
in acquittal cases, especially given that the double jeopardy clause bars
retrials based on new evidence.44 While scholars could theoretically examine
acquittals and render opinions—based on little more (and often less) than the
information already available to the legal system—the undertaking would be
enormous and those opinions would not be worth much and would prove
little. Thus, even the very limited tools that exist for trying to estimate a
false conviction rate simply do not exist for trying to estimate a false
acquittal rate. Hence, Sam Gross and Barbara O’Brien’s observation about
the challenges in assessing a false conviction rate applies with even more
force to false negatives: “The fundamental problem with false convictions is
also one of their defining features: they are hidden from view. In most cases
false convictions are not merely invisible but hard if not impossible to
identify when we try.”45 While Professor Laudan recognizes this dearth of
data, and laments it, he does not let that stop him, he simply makes a guess
(a quite debatable guess), and advocates wholesale constitutional revision on
the basis of the assumptions underlying that guess.
At the outset, one has to wonder why Professor Laudan focuses so much
effort on claiming that false acquittals are the central problem facing our
criminal justice system today. Professor Laudan begins his piece with an
43
The average time from conviction to exoneration among the DNA cases is 14 years.
2017 Innocence Project, DNA Exonerations in the United States, https://www.innocencepr
oject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2018). For the
exonerations listed in the broader National Registry of Exonerations, the average time spent
in prison before exoneration is 8.7. The National Registry of Exonerations, Exonerations by
State, (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerationsin-the-United-States-Map.aspx.
44
Professor Laudan instead objects that we cling to the double jeopardy bar that prevents
the state from appealing not guilty verdicts or ever retrying an acquitted individual. See, e.g.,
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 10–11. But this robust version of the Constitution’s double jeopardy
clause is long-settled in this country. Debating the wisdom of that constitutional provision or
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it is more than I can take on in this relatively short
response to Professor Laudan. For my purposes here, it is enough to note that the double
jeopardy clause poses a virtually insurmountable obstacle to the type of assessment of
mistaken acquittals upon which Professor Laudan’s argument depends.
45
Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction:
Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL. LEGAL STUD. 927,
928 (2008).
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epigrammatic quote from Daniel Givelber to the effect that “[a]cquittals are
the mystery disposition of the criminal justice system.”46 But, building off
of that to argue that the system acquits too many guilty people, Professor
Laudan overlooks that one significant reason Professor Givelber says that
acquittals are such a mystery is because they are so rare.47 Indeed, as
Professor Givelber notes, the data show that the ratio of convictions to
acquittals in federal court is somewhere between fifty to seventy convictions
for every acquittal.48 Given the rarity of acquittals (and the necessarily much
smaller category of “false” acquittals), it is difficult to discern why one
would focus on false acquittals as a significant criminal justice problem.
That is especially so given that a certain minimal level of acquittals is
essential to any legitimate system of criminal justice. Without some small
yet significant rate of acquittals—which appears to be right where we are—
the system would appear (and likely would be) rigged, and would lose its
integrity as a check on governmental power. Moving the acquittal rate much,
if any, below what we already have, therefore runs a significant risk of that
delegitimizing effect.
Undaunted, Professor Laudan builds his argument for fundamental
realignment of the criminal justice system on extrapolation and assumptions
from thin reeds of evidence about false acquittals. For his estimates, he relies
primarily on Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel’s classic study of judge and
jury agreement and disagreement,49 and data on jury verdicts in Scotland,
where juries have the option of rendering two types of acquittal verdicts:
“guilt not proven” and “not guilty.”50 For example, turning to Kalven and
Zeisel’s study, Professor Laudan notes the rate at which judges would have
convicted when juries acquitted, which Kalven & Zeisel found to be about
17% of the cases.51 Professor Laudan further notes that, among the cases
included in Kalven & Zeisel’s study, the judges reported that they believed
that only about 15% of the acquittals were clear acquittals, and 85% were
close cases.52 Professor Laudan then takes at face value that this means that
the close cases—85% of the acquittals—”are close enough to warrant an
assumption that these are probably factually guilty defendants.”53 From data
46

LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation
and Data About the Acquitted, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (2005)).
47
Givelber, supra note 46, at 1167.
48
Givelber, supra note 46, at 1167, n.3 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1999, 419, 460 (Ann L. Pastore &
Kathleen Maguire eds., 2000)).
49
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 5.
50
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 58.
51
KALVEN & ZEISEL supra note 5, at 56.
52
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 59.
53
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 59.
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and reasoning of this type, Professor Laudan ultimately concludes that he
can make a good guess at a rate of false acquittals, while in the process
ignoring Kalven & Zeisel’s own caution that “[i]t is not easy to know what
to make of these figures.”54
Professor Laudan’s willingness to accept the judges’ perceptions of the
closeness of the evidence as proof of guilt also ignores the lessons from the
wrongful conviction cases: that virtually every one of the exoneration cases
involved evidence that convinced prosecutor, judge, jury, and often even
defense counsel, that the defendant was clearly guilty.55 The exoneration
cases tell us we cannot just assume that even judges’ assessments of the
evidence can reliably tell us what portion of jury verdicts are factually
erroneous.
Kalven & Zeisel’s study is widely acknowledged as path breaking
largely because of its data identifying a cluster of cases in which the judge
and jury disagreed about the outcome of the case—most often cases in which
the judge would have convicted but the jury acquitted (a total of about 17%
of all cases). Any assumption that those disagreements provide further
support for a claim of widespread false negatives in jury verdicts, however,
must be reconciled with the reasons Kalven & Zeisel identified as factors
that they thought accounted for the disagreements between judge and jury:
evidence factors (i.e., differential weighting of the evidence); facts only the
judge knew; disparity of counsel; jury sentiments about the individual
defendant; and jury sentiments about the law.56
The claim that the cases in Kalven & Zeisel’s study in which the jury
acquitted but the judge would have convicted represent factually erroneous
verdicts would have the strongest claim in those cases in which the judge
had access to inculpatory evidence that the jury did not. But that accounts
for only 2% of the cases in which the judges would have convicted but the
jury acquitted; excluded evidence is virtually inconsequential as an
explanation for acquittals in Kalven & Zeisel’s study.57 Moreover, even in
that category of cases, we cannot be confident that the judge was right and
the jury was wrong—that is, that the jury’s verdict was a “false acquittal” as
a factual matter—because in some of those cases the additional evidence that
the judge would have considered would have included evidence that the
54

LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 58; KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 49, at 57.
Brandon Garrett’s analysis of the first 200 DNA exonerations, for example, revealed
that courts denied relief to almost all of these actually innocent people, granted innocencebased relief to none, found most errors to be harmless because of their assessment that the
evidence was strong, and even opined in many cases that the evidence against these innocent
people was “overwhelming.” Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
55, 61 (2008).
56
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 5, at 106–07.
57
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 5, at 121 n.1.
55
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Rules of Evidence exclude because the evidence has a tendency to impede
rational fact-finding.58 This includes evidence like character and propensity
evidence,59 unreliable forensic evidence or expert opinions,60 coerced
confessions,61 the judge’s personal knowledge of the parties or other extrajudicial facts62 (which can be unreliable, and hence, legally cannot be
considered because they are either highly prejudicial, or not subject to
adversarial testing for veracity and accuracy), or a wide range of evidence
the judge herself deemed to be far more prejudicial than probative.63
Moreover, it is not safe to assume that every acquittal of even an
arguably guilty individual is truly a “false acquittal.” Juries acquit for a wide
variety of reasons, some based on conclusions about guilt, and others,
equally legitimate in our constitutional system, on conclusions about mercy
or constraint of government overreaching. Indeed, Kalven & Zeisel
hypothesized that jury acquittals in cases where judges would convict might
reflect precisely that type of communitarian expression of restraint. From
their analysis of the judge-jury disagreement cases, Kalven & Zeisel
developed a “liberation hypothesis”—the theory that, when the evidence was
close, the jury felt “liberated” to acquit for non-fact reasons, such as
sympathy for the accused or sentiment about the law.64 Daniel Givelber
explains it this way:
[Kalven & Zeisel] identified juries as more likely to acquit than
judges, and developed a liberation hypothesis to explain the
disparity. If the case is close on the evidence, the jury is liberated
to permit sentiment to guide its decision. In their words, the jury
“yields to sentiment in the apparent process of resolving doubts as
58

Of course, some excluded evidence is highly probative and excluding it serves other
criminal justice system values, while impeding the search for the truth. That is especially true
of exclusion of evidence for violation of the Fourth Amendment, for example. But that is not
true of all excluded evidence. See text accompanying notes 58-64.
59
See FED. R. EVID. 404.
60
See FED. R. EVID. 703.
61
Historically it was recognized, and empirically it is now being confirmed, that one risk
of coerced confessions is that they can often be actually false—yet still very persuasive to
factfinders. See e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions
in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004).
62
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 5, at 123.
63
See FED. R. EVID. 403. Lest one think that judges, unlike juries, are not likely to be
influenced by evidence that they themselves recognize to be inadmissible, the empirical
evidence shows the contrary. See, e.g., D. Brian Wallace & Saul M. Kassin, Harmless Error
Analysis: How Do Judges Respond to Confession Errors?, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 154
(2012) (finding that experienced judges who recognized that a confession was coerced and
hence inadmissible were nonetheless significantly influenced by the confession when
assessing the defendant’s guilt or innocence).
64
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 5, at 106, 165–66.
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to evidence. The jury, therefore, is able to conduct its revolt from
the law within the etiquette of resolving issues of fact.”
Apparently unlike judges, juries permitted extra-legal concerns to
temper strict justice when they acquitted the guilty.65
Professor Givelber, however, questions this hypothesis, arguing that the
empirical evidence supports the conclusion that juries usually acquit
because, based on the evidence, the defendant is probably innocent.
Contrary to the lesson that Professor Laudan draws from Kalven & Zeisel’s
work, the evidence suggests that juries do not regularly acquit irrationally,
or based on too-much fidelity to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
(if that is not an oxymoron). Although Professor Laudan begins his piece
with a quote from Professor Givelber about the mystery of acquittals,
Professor Givelber has repeatedly written about the rationality, and indeed
reliability, of jury acquittals. Professor Givelber asserts, indeed, that
“[d]espite the enormous publicity generated by apparently irrational
acquittals, there appears to be no basis for believing that these are anything
but aberrational events.”66 And his book, Not Guilty: Are the Acquitted
Innocent?, persuasively and extensively makes the case, based on analysis
of the empirical evidence, that acquittals are best read as factually
supportable conclusions of actual innocence.67
B. Charging and Dismissal Errors
Professor Laudan makes clear, it should be noted, that when he
discusses “false acquittals” he means “false negatives” more broadly,
including not just erroneous jury verdicts, but also dismissals by prosecutors
in cases where the accused was actually guilty.68 Combining his assessment
of erroneous jury verdicts and prosecutor dismissals of charges against guilty
suspects, he settles on a false negative rate of about 38%–40%.69
With regard to dismissals, Professor Laudan’s claim is that the
reasonable doubt standard is producing false negatives by imposing such a
high burden on prosecutors that they are likely to dismiss cases, even when
convinced of guilt, because they fear they will be unable to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. To support this conclusion, Professor Laudan
relies primarily on survey data of prosecutors. He notes that in several

65
Givelber, supra note 47, at 1168 (footnotes omitted) (citing KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra
note 5, at 165).
66
Givelber, supra note 47, at 1169.
67
DANIEL GIVELBER & AMY FARRELL, NOT GUILTY: ARE THE ACQUITTED INNOCENT?
(2012).
68
Laudan, supra note 3, at 1244.
69
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 64–65.
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surveys, prosecutors have identified a range of reasons for dismissing cases,
many of which have nothing to do with doubts about guilt.70 But that too is
a very shaky foundation upon which to determine a factual rate of false
negatives, both because survey data is among the least reliable for assessing
what people actually do and why they do it, and because prosecutors’
judgments about guilt or innocence are far from a gold standard for assessing
factual truth, even if they are accurately reporting their motivations for
dismissing cases. As has been reported elsewhere, a host of cognitive biases
and institutional pressures makes it difficult, if not impossible, for
prosecutors (like everyone else) to assess evidence objectively and reliably.71
And the record of prosecutorial resistance to claims of innocence, even in
the face of overwhelming evidence of innocence (including DNA) in
exoneration cases, undermines any suggestion that prosecutorial judgments
can be relied upon as any sort of litmus test of actual innocence.72
While it surely is true that prosecutors in some cases dismiss charges
despite a firm belief in guilt, it is difficult to know how much that explains,
because the reality is there is little empirical evidence on the matter.73 One
certainly cannot conclude, as does Professor Laudan, that it must mean the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, virtually alone, is forcing prosecutors
to dismiss cases against a large number of actually guilty people.
Experience, legal standards, and empirical evidence suggest that the “beyond
a reasonable doubt” standard might not be the culprit in this process that
Professor Laudan thinks it is, or that the dismissals are therefore factually
wrong. Professor Laudan largely dismisses the significance of all of the
many reasons that prosecutors dismiss cases that have little or nothing to do
with proof beyond a reasonable doubt—political judgments and office
policies (for example, policies not to prosecute certain types of crimes);
70

Id. at 60–62.
See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006); Keith A. Findley & Michael S.
Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291
(2006).
72
See Amy Bach, Extraordinary Wrongful Convictions, Ordinary Measures—Why
Measurement Matters, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1219, 1221 (2010); Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s
Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475 (2006); Alafair Burke,
Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 512
(2007); Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1179–84 (2010); Daniel
S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of
Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 140–44 (2004); D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted:
An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
761, 765 (2007).
73
According to John Pfaff, who studied justice system data for fifteen years, “Perhaps
most problematically, we have almost no information whatsoever on what prosecutors do or
how (or why) they do it.” JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS
INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 17 (2017).
71
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caseload pressures; and simple lack of evidence (regardless of the standard
of proof). Professor Laudan ignores that, in our system, prosecutors have
virtually unfettered and unreviewable discretion in charging,74 and that
concomitant with that authority comes the responsibility to screen cases that
are brought to them by police. In the caselaw and literature on prosecutors,
effective screening—dismissal of cases—by prosecutors is seen as a strength
of the system, not a flaw.75
Ethics rules and legal standards further make clear that prosecutorial
decisions are not necessarily driven exclusively or perhaps even
predominantly by the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. ABA standards
on the prosecution function require only probable cause to initiate and pursue
a prosecution.76 Likewise, under the Fourth Amendment, police need only
probable cause to make an arrest, and prosecutors need only probable cause
to indict or obtain a bindover at a preliminary hearing to permit the case to
proceed to trial. Professor Laudan misunderstands this to mean that, “[t]o
make an arrest official, the police must persuade either a judge or a grand
jury (or both) that a rational person, confronted with the available evidence,
would conclude that the defendant probably committed the crime.”77
Professor Laudan elaborates, still incorrectly, that by the time a case enters
the prosecution process the accused “is considered by the police, a grand jury
and/or the arraigning judge to be more likely than not to be guilty on the
available evidence.”78 But probable cause does not require any showing that
the accused “probably” or “more-likely-than-not” committed the crime. The
probable cause standard—whether for arrest, indictment, or other
charging—is explicitly a lower standard than that. Probable cause means
nothing more than that there is a reasonable basis for believing that a crime
may have been committed, and that the accused may have committed it; that
basis may be well below 50-50.79 Professor Laudan’s misunderstanding of
74

E.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978).
See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Dismissals as Teachable Moments (and
Databases) for the Police, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); State v. Farrell, 293
A.2d 176, 179 (N.J. 1972) (“The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is
not to convict, but to see that justice is done.”).
76
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
Standard 3-3.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (“A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be
instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows
that the charges are not supported by probable cause.”).
77
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 62.
78
Id.
79
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (“[T]he term ‘probable cause,’ according to its
usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation. . . . It imports
a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion. . . .” (quoting Locke, 11 U.S. at
348)); see also id. at 235 (“Finely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt
or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate’s
decision. While an effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of certainty
75
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this may help explain in part why he appears so willing to accept police and
prosecutor judgments of guilt as approximations of ground truth.
Moreover, while the law ostensibly creates a presumption of innocence,
it is widely recognized, both as a matter of theory and empirics, that
prosecutors are actually aided by a presumption of guilt, at least once the
first bits of evidence are introduced,80 which makes proof beyond a
reasonable doubt far less daunting.81 Nearly fifty years ago, in his classic
work modeling the criminal justice system, Herbert Packer observed, “[t]he
presumption of guilt is what makes it possible for the system to deal
efficiently with large numbers, as the Crime Control Model demands.”82
Surveys of prosecutors confirm that more than half do not presume that a
person is innocent until proven guilty, and that “[m]any believe that once an
accused reaches the trial stage, his guilt has been determined by the screening
processes of the police and prosecutor.”83 Michael Saks and Michael
Risinger note that “[s]ome evidence exists to suggest that jurors set their
probabilities lower than they think they do,” and that jurors might actually
start with “assumptions close to zero (innocence), but to which they attach[]
very little weight, so that the presumption of innocence [is] abandoned as
soon as the first piece of inculpatory evidence [is] presented.”84 Daniel
Givelber explains: “Jurors apparently do not listen, evaluate and deliberate
on the assumption that the defendant is innocent unless the government
proves otherwise. Rather, jurors take the logical position that they are in
equipoise concerning the defendant’s guilt and will await the presentation of
evidence before reaching a verdict.”85 Still others have argued that the
reasonable doubt instruction, as currently formulated in most jurisdictions,
is significantly weaker than as first developed at common law86 and is
corresponding to ‘probable cause’ may not be helpful, it is clear that ‘only the probability,
and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’”
(quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419)).
80
Michael J. Saks & D. Michael Risinger, Baserates, the Presumption of Guilt,
Admissibility Rulings, and Erroneous Convictions, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2003)
(citing Thomas M. Ostrom, Carol Werner & Michael J. Saks, An Integration Theory Analysis
of Jurors’ Presumptions of Guilt or Innocence, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 436
(1978)).
81
See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We
Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1326 (1997); BOAZ SANGERO,
SAFETY FROM FALSE CONVICTIONS 68, 72–73 (2016); John Baldwin, Police Interrogation:
What Are the Rules of the Game?, in SUSPICION AND SILENCE: THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 67 (David Morgan & Geoffrey M. Stephenson eds., 1994).
82
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 160 (1968).
83
George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 112
(1975).
84
Saks & Risinger, supra note 80, at 1056.
85
Givelber, supra note 81, at 1372.
86
See Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the
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sometimes misunderstood by juries as weaker than the law requires.87 The
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is not likely to have the overwhelming
effects Professor Laudan attributes to it.
Other reasons exist as well for doubting that the reasonable doubt
standard is forcing prosecutors to dismiss charges against actually guilty
people on a massive scale. Law and economics scholars contend that, when
a prosecutor believes in an individual’s guilt but has proof problems, her
response is likely not to dismiss the case outright, but rather to engage in
bargaining by reducing the charges or the sentence, discounting either or
both by the perceived likelihood of an acquittal.88 Or worse, the prosecutor
with a weak hand but a firm belief in guilt might be inclined to bend the
rules, deliberately or unwittingly, in ways designed to ensure a conviction,
such as by failing to recognize Brady material, permitting use of a suggestive
eyewitness identification procedure, or overzealously coaching witnesses.89
To a prosecutor who believes in the accused’s guilt, the only outcome that
will be seen as serving justice is a conviction, and so she will be highly
motivated to find some way to achieve that outcome, despite proof
problems.90
Evidence for this hypothesis can be found in Gould et al.’s empirical
study of the causes of wrongful convictions. Professor Gould and his
colleagues found that, among the factors that are significantly correlated with
false convictions is a prosecutor’s weak case.91 In at least some cases where
prosecutors might have doubts about their ability to meet the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard, therefore, the weak evidence and high standard
did not combine to produce dismissals, but wrongful convictions. Gould et
al. hypothesized that this could be because:

Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1165, 1170 (2003) (arguing that the proof required to convict has shifted from a “certainty”
standard to a much weaker one, in which juries are instructed to acquit only if they can identify
reasonable doubts, defined as specific and articulable doubts).
87
Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt
About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105 (1999) (finding inconsistency and confusion
among jurors, including that some jurors understand the reasonable doubt standard to be less
rigorous than civil standards, depending on the wording of the instruction); Elisabeth
Stoffelmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and Flexibility in
Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 769, 774–78 (2000)
(discussing empirical studies on the effect of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard).
88
See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
89
See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL.
550, 559-62 (1987).
90
Id. at 554.
91
Jon B. Gould, Julia Carrano, Richard Leo & Joseph Young, Predicting Erroneous
Convictions: A Social Science Approach to Miscarriage of Justice, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471, 491,
494, 501–02.
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Weak facts may also encourage prosecutors to engage in certain
behaviors designed to bolster the case, which our statistics show
help predict an erroneous conviction. In several of our erroneous
convictions, a prosecutor, convinced of the defendant’s guilt
despite a lack of conclusive proof, failed to recognize and turn
over exculpatory evidence or enlisted a snitch or other noneyewitness to provide dubious corroborating testimony. These
types of actions compound, rather than rectify, previous errors or
misconduct in the case.92
The high rate of plea bargaining in this country (more than 95% of all
convictions are obtained by pleas93), along with considerable empirical and
anecdotal evidence, further suggests that prosecutors confronted with the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard and weak evidence are making hardto-refuse plea offers rather than just dismissing cases.94 Albert Alschuler
describes it this way:
Convicting defendants who would be acquitted at trial is one of
the principal goals of plea bargaining. “Half a loaf is better than
none,” prosecutors say. “When we have a weak case for any
reason, we’ll reduce to almost anything rather than lose.” If the
correlation between “weak cases” and actual innocence is better
than random, plea bargaining surely “convict[s] defendants who
are in fact innocent (and would be acquitted [at trial]).”95
This is what Professor Alschuler calls “odds bargaining”: bargaining “to
ensure conviction in doubtful cases.”96 And if it occurs with any
frequency—which it surely does—it undermines Professor Laudan’s thesis
that the reasonable doubt standard is forcing prosecutors to dismiss cases
against factually guilty defendants in alarming numbers.
92

Id. at 501.
In 2012, out of 87,908 cases in federal district court that resulted in a conviction,
85,774 (97.757%) were the result of a plea (85,640 guilty pleas and 134 nolo contendere
pleas). MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 2012-STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl. 4.2 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/p
df/fjs12st.pdf.
94
New empirical research, involving analysis of actual case files from two New York
prosecutors’ offices, reveals, among other things, that among all defendants, those who denied
guilt but ultimately took a plea deal received “the largest-sized plea discounts when they did
plea.” Allison D. Redlich, Shi Yan, Robert J. Norris & Shawn D. Bushway, The Influence of
Confessions on Guilty Pleas and Plea Discounts, PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & LAW 10 (2017),
available online first, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/law0000144 .
95
Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 ALB. L.
REV. 940, 940 (2015) (emphasis in original).
96
Id.
93
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As a stark illustration of this, consider cases in which innocence
advocacy organizations have marshaled strong new evidence of innocence
(strong enough, at least, to meet the very high hurdles for overturning a
conviction97). Prosecutors often respond not by dismissing the cases, but by
offering plea bargains too good to turn down—often, remarkably, “time
served” even on serious homicide charges.98 Viewing this through an “odds
bargaining” or law-and-economics lens suggests that prosecutors in these
cases must recognize that the evidence is extraordinarily weak—and that
indeed the accused might be (or even likely is) innocent. Law and economics
theory contends that rational prosecutors and defendants engaged in pleabargaining will start with an expected sentencing outcome in a case and
discount it by the likelihood of acquittal.99 That is to say, the literature
predicts that parties strike plea bargains in the shadow of expected trial
outcomes. The parties forecast the expected sentence after trial, discount it
by the probability of acquittal, and offer some proportional discount. Hence,
a prosecutor will offer a deal that is greater than or equal to his or her
expected value of the trial, and the defendant will accept it if it is less than
or equal to his or her expected value of the trial. So, for example, in simple
terms, if the expected sentence after trial is 20 years, and the probability of
conviction at trial is .8, both parties will see a plea bargain of 16 years as a
97

See Garrett, supra note 55, at 128-30 (describing the obstacles to overturning
convictions, even in cases where the defendant was actually innocent); Daniel Medwed, Up
the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA
Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655 (2005).
98
See, e.g., Megan Rose, The Deal Prosecutors Offer When They Have No Cards Left to
Play, ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/whatdoes-an-innocent-man-have-to-do-to-go-free-plead-guilty/539001/ (noting that “in Baltimore
City and County alone—two separate jurisdictions with their own state’s attorneys—
ProPublica identified at least 10 cases in the last 19 years in which defendants with viable
innocence claims ended up signing Alford pleas or time-served deals. In each case,
exculpatory evidence was uncovered, persuasive enough to garner new trials, evidentiary
hearings, or writs of actual innocence”); Facing Life: The Retrial of Evan Zimmerman, (A&E
Television Networks 2006) (chronicling how, after Evan Zimmerman, a Wisconsin man who
had served just three years of a life sentence for murder, was offered a plea bargain to time
served after his conviction was vacated based on new evidence of innocence—evidence that
ultimately forced the prosecutor to dismiss all charges with prejudice when Zimmerman
refused to take the plea deal).
99
See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining and Price, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV 920
(2016); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
289, 295–96 (1983); Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social
Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 749, 753–55 (1983); Williams M. Landes, An Economic Analysis
of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser.
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Louis
M. Natali, Jr., Plea Bargaining in the Free Enterprise System, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61, 61 (1971);
Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV.
713, 713–14 (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 775–79 (8th ed.
2011).
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rational choice. While this is obviously a grossly simplified and incomplete
description of what happens in plea bargaining,100 there is at least enough
truth to it101 to suggest that in many of these “innocence” cases, prosecutors
recognize that the chances of conviction are virtually zero. Yet they are not
dismissing these cases. Instead, they offer deals that are as close to no-cost
to the defendants as possible (time served), thereby making it difficult for
even the most risk-tolerant defendant to turn it down. Professor Laudan’s
assumption that prosecutors handling cases in which they believe in guilt to
some degree, but cannot meet the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, will
uniformly dismiss those cases cannot be reconciled with this reality.
Given these possibilities—indeed realities—it is odd that Professor
Laudan would hang his argument on assumptions that, of all the features in
the criminal justice system, it is the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
that is most responsible for creating error and victimization. Not only is
there no reason to believe that the reasonable doubt standard is working
considerable mischief, one cannot conclude, as does Professor Laudan, that
prosecutorial dismissals must reflect some significant rate of false negatives,
especially anything as large and specific as the 40% rate Professor Laudan
derives from it.
In the end, while it would be useful to know rates of error, we simply
cannot know those rates across crime categories and jurisdictions in any
meaningful way, because we do not have anything close to perfect access to
information; all we have is human judgment. Hence, to focus on error rates
is to ask the wrong question, and indeed begs error in the analysis by reliance
on what can be little more than guesswork. The focus instead must be on
how to improve the efficacy of investigations and the diagnosticity of trials,
regardless of what the error rate might be. This is a point to which I will
return later in this piece.
IV. ERRORS IN WEIGHING HARMS
Note that the Laudan Algorithm, entirely apart from any questions
about methodology for estimating victimization rates, counts all
victimizations as of equal value. To Professor Laudan, the harm
victimization by a wrongful conviction is exactly the same as the harm
caused by every recidivist’s violent crime. That is how he comes up with his
100

See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463 (2004); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV 2548 (2004).
101
Indeed, there is empirical evidence to support the theory. See Shawn D. Bushway &
Allison D. Redlich, Is Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial” a Mirage?, 28 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 437 (2012); Shawn D. Bushway, Allison D. Redlich & Robert
J. Norris, An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial,” 52 CRIMINOLOGY
723 (2014).
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ratio of 2.2 to 1.2—he says every false conviction creates 2.2 victimizations,
and every false acquittal creates 1.2, with each type of victimization worth
exactly the same. But is that really true? Simply counting repeat offenses,
even repeat violent offenses, masks wide variations in conduct and harm. A
violent crime might be anything from premeditated murder to a barroom
tussle, or an unwanted shove or slap. Indeed, there is good reason to believe
that the vast majority of violent offenses that Professor Laudan counts as of
full value—a “1” in his formula—are of the lesser types—often more
annoyances and insults than real threats to community well-being. That is
likely a fairer assessment of what the large number of probation dispositions
or comparatively short sentences that Professor Laudan references mean,
rather than Professor Laudan’s assessment that, even in our uniquely
punitive society with unparalleled levels of incarceration, the sentences that
judges impose are soft.
A. The Harms from False Negatives
Professor Laudan’s equation also falters because he assumes that every
conviction of a guilty person is an unqualified good, because it reduces the
risk other victimization. For some offenses—murder and violent sexual
offenses, for example—few would disagree that every conviction is
desirable. But there is a wide array of crimes, even violent crimes, for which
conviction and imprisonment might sometimes cause more victimization
than they would prevent. Murder and rape convictions make up only a very
small proportion of all criminal convictions—even of all convictions for
violent crimes—together only about 2% of all felony convictions, and a
much smaller percentage of all crimes.102 For many crimes, imprisonment
in some circumstances likely increases the risk of recidivating, which may
in turn generate other crimes. As Cecelia Klingele notes, “[g]iven the social
disruption, isolation, and substandard conditions that define the experience
of imprisonment in America today, it is no surprise that people who are
incarcerated are at a higher risk of being re-incarcerated in the future.”103
Marzin Zalman puts it this way: “All the anti-Blackstonians, especially
Allen/Laudan and Cassell, emphasize the costs of crime. But any analysis
of system effectiveness and system errors needs to consider . . . the effects
or costs of crime control as well.104

102

Gross & O’Brien, supra note 45, at 938 (citing Matthew R. Durose & Patrick A.
Langan, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2000, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST.
STATISTICS 2 tbl. 1 (2003)).
103
Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 537, 548 (2015).
104
Marvin Zalman, The Anti-Blackstonians: Thinking About Different Strokes, 48 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1319 (2017).
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Indeed, while Professor Laudan and the other anti-Blackstonians
employ simple calculations of the crime-suppressing effects of
imprisonment (and conversely, the crime-inducing effects of every failure to
convict the guilty), their analysis is remarkably one-dimensional and blind
to the myriad factors that contribute to crime. More nuanced, deeper
analyses, such as the comprehensive review recently completed by the
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, make clear
that the numbers are neither as clear nor as dramatic as Professor Laudan
would have it. Indeed, the NRC report concludes, contrary to the grand
claims made by Professor Laudan, that “[m]ost studies estimate the crimereducing effect of incarceration to be small.”105
Additionally, Professor Laudan’s calculation depends on offender
uniformity—the notion that every guilty individual accused of a crime is just
as likely as the next to commit future crimes. But that assumption too is
unwarranted, and skews the crime-prevention value of each additional
conviction in ways designed to support Professor Laudan’s thesis. As the
NRC observed, recidivism rates for accused individuals are not uniform, but
subject to “stochastic selectivity:” High-rate offenders are more likely to be
apprehended and convicted than less frequent offenders, simply because
their behavior exposes them to jeopardy more frequently. Accordingly,
“they will be represented in prison disproportionately relative to their
representation in the population of nonincarcerated offenders.”106 As
Professor Zalman observes, therefore, “beyond a certain point, incarcerating
more offenders is likely to capture low-rate offenders resulting in
diminishing crime-reduction returns for every person incarcerated and for
every year of incarceration.”107 Professor Laudan’s simple equation ignores
this reality, and thereby overstates the value of incrementally convicting and
imprisoning more people.
Moreover, the social dislocation and disruption occasioned by high
levels of incarceration represents another cost of conviction of the guilty that
Professor Laudan’s equation entirely overlooks. Imprisonment deprives
children and spouses of their parents and partners,108 and at high-enough
105
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, THE GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 155 (Jeremy
Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014).
106
Id. at 142–43.
107
Zalman, supra note 104, at 1340.
108
A robust body of literature in sociology and criminology empirically shows a large
negative effect of parental incarceration on life course outcomes for children. See Holly
Foster & John Hagan, Maternal and Paternal Imprisonment and Children’s Social Exclusion
in Young Adulthood, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 387 (2016); Christopher Wildeman,
Signe Hald Andersen, Hedwig Lee, & Kristian Bernt Karlson, Parental Incarceration and
Child Mortality in Denmark, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 428 (2014); Holly Foster & John
Hagan, Incarceration and Intergenerational Social Exclusion, 54 SOC. PROBLEMS 399 (2007);

FINDLEY_FORMATTED.DOCXFINDLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

REDUCING ERROR

8/10/2018 9:44 AM

1291

levels (as it is in many, especially urban, neighborhoods), imperils entire
communities. Professor Klingele explains:
Communities are also negatively affected by mass imprisonment.
A host of formal and informal collateral consequences—including
disenfranchisement, deportation, exclusion from public housing,
and limitations on employment licensing—await those who have
been incarcerated, making them less productive parents and
citizens when they return home. In places with disproportionately
high rates of incarceration, traditional family structures are
weakened, democratic power is diluted, and neighborhoods are
destabilized.109
For many crimes, some such disruption is unavoidable and most would agree
it is worth the cost, but that simply is not so for all offenders and all crimes,
even all violent crimes. To treat all offending, even all violent offending, as
equally well-served by conviction and imprisonment—as a “1” in Professor
Laudan’s calculus—therefore also defies reason and undermines the utility
of Professor Laudan’s project.

Christopher Wildeman & Bruce Western, Incarceration in Fragile Families, 20 FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 157 (2010), https://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/20_
02_08.pdf; Sytske Besemer et al., The Relationship Between Parental Imprisonment and
Offspring Offending in England and the Netherlands, 51 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 413 (2011).
This includes negative academic outcomes. See Rosa Minhyo Cho, Impact of Maternal
Imprisonment on Children’s Probability of Grade Retention, 20 J. URBAN ECON. 11 (2009);
Rosa Minhyo Cho, Maternal Incarceration and Children’s Adolescent Outcomes: Timing and
Dosage, 84 SOC. SERV. REV. 257 (2010); Foster & Hagan, supra; Wildeman et al., supra;
Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, Parental Imprisonment: Effects on Boys’ Antisocial
Behaviour and Delinquency Through the Life-Course, 46 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY
1269 (2005); Joseph Murray, David P. Farrington & Ivana Sekol, Children’s Antisocial
Behavior, Mental Health, Drug Use, and Educational Performance After Parental
Incarceration: A Systematic Review and MetMeta-Analysis, 138 PSYCHOL. BULL. 175 (2012);
Christopher Wildeman, Parental Incarceration and Children’s Physically Aggressive
Behaviors: Evidence from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, 889 SOC. FORCES
285 (2010). But see Stephen B. Billings, Parental Arrest, Incarceration and the Outcomes of
Their Children (Mar. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3034539
(finding that parental arrest coincides with negative outcomes for children, but that
incarceration of a parent may have short-term benefits for children as a result of removing
negative role models from the child’s home environment).
109
Klingele, supra note 103, at 549 (citing TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES:
HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007)); JEFF
MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 157–63 (2006); Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution,
Representation, and the Debate Over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147,
1148–49 (2004); Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and the Disappearing Voters, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 50, 58 (Marc Mauer
& Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002)).

FINDLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

1292

8/10/2018 9:44 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1265

Finally, this discussion would be incomplete without at least noting the
financial cost of mass incarceration. Professor Laudan’s proposal—to lock
up more people, and for longer—is oblivious to the fiscal crises facing most
jurisdictions today caused in part by our very high rates of incarceration.
Across this country, in the last decade or so, state after state has begun to
search for ways to reduce incarceration rates because they simply cannot
afford to continue to fund mass incarceration at current levels, let alone the
enormously increased levels Professor Laudan proposes.110 The reality is,
we cannot imprison our way out of crime. What we need are other solutions.
For reasons that are not clear, Professor Laudan focuses single-mindedly on
imprisonment as the only solution to crime, without any consideration of
alternative approaches that might be more effective and less costly in both
human and financial terms.
B. The Harms from False Convictions
On the other side of the equation, false convictions also come in all
degrees, from convictions for petty misdemeanors to capital murder. The
vast majority of the exonerations we know about are of the more serious
type—indeed, 99% of the DNA exonerations involve murder, rape, or rapemurder.111 There is good reason to believe, however, that even far more false
convictions arise in petty crimes and various misdemeanor cases112 and
lower-level felonies or offenses that result in short or no prison sentences.
But the reality is that such injustices are rarely discovered, because no
resources are spent on trying to find and correct them. As Professors Gross
and O’Brien have observed, these small-case wrongful convictions are
almost surely far more numerous than the serious-crime wrongful
convictions that we know about, yet we know almost nothing about them.113
110
See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love & Cecelia Klingele, First Thoughts About “Second
Look” and other Sentence Reduction Provisions of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing
Revision, 42 TOLEDO L. REV. 859, 859 (2011) (“After two decades of escalating prison
populations, jurisdictions throughout the country are beginning to experience the significant
ramifications of globally-unparalleled rates of confinement. The high cost of incarceration,
coupled with the disproportionate burden on minority communities, has led many
jurisdictions to question whether prison terms should be so frequently and indiscriminately
imposed, and whether they should be so long.”); Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early
Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415 (2012).
111
Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 55, at 73.
112
See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, Misdemeanors, in ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, A
REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 1 (Erik Luna ed., 2018)
(“Enormous, fast, and highly informal, the [misdemeanor] system sweeps up and processes
millions of people in ways that diverge wildly from traditional criminal justice ideals. People
often do not get a lawyer; evidence is rarely scrutinized; proceedings can take mere minutes.
Most people plead guilty, typically very quickly. Many convictions are inaccurate; many
violate the Constitution.”).
113
Gross & O’Brien, supra note 45, at 938.
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Nonetheless, it is almost certainly true that most, if not all, false
convictions—even in the misdemeanor cases—are costly and profoundly
damaging, to a degree that cannot be said of all victimization of crimes, even
violent crimes. Professor Laudan’s 1-1 ratio of the cost of a false conviction
to the wrongly convicted individual and the cost of every crime victimization
ignores that, regardless of the sentence imposed, every prosecution and every
conviction is a devastating experience. The stress of accusation alone is
overwhelming. The expense of defense can be enormous. The loss of one’s
good name, of friendships and family relationships, of employment, of
savings, of the ability to find future employment and housing, and the
corrosive effects of being marginalized and disbelieved by one’s own
government—all are regular features of false convictions, regardless of the
sentence imposed.114 And then consider the enormous losses occasioned by
imprisonment.
Beyond those direct punishments, the collateral
consequences of convictions tally literally in the thousands.115 For those
wrongly convicted who have prior (or subsequent) valid convictions, those
consequences might be marginally less significant, but the sense of injustice
attendant to being falsely accused and convicted still works unmeasurable
harm. A criminal conviction, especially a felony conviction, marks a person
for life, making it enormously difficult to obtain employment, housing, and
education.
One way to assess this is to note that, given all these harms, most of us,
no doubt, if given the choice between being victimized by all but the most
serious crimes, or being wrongfully convicted and imprisoned for any length
of time, would elect the former rather than the latter.116 Either possibility is
of course horrible, but for many if not most crime victims, recovery in a
supportive community is largely possible, even likely. The same simply
114
For some of the literature on the crushing emotional harms caused by wrongful
convictions of the innocent, see Kathryn Campbell & Myriam Denov, The Burden of
Innocence: Coping with a Wrongful Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM.
JUST. 139 (2004); Rashaan A. DeShay, “A Lot of People Go Insane Behind That”: Coping
with the Trauma of Being Wrongfully Convicted, 29 CRIM. JUST. STUD.: A CRITICAL J. OF
CRIME, L. & SOC’Y 189 (2004); Adrian Grounds, Psychological Consequences of Wrongful
Conviction and Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 165 (2004).
115
See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA KLINGELE,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE (2016).
116
On this point, it is worth noting that Professor Laudan builds his argument, equating
every wrongful conviction with every violent crime victimization, on data suggesting that in
2008 1.7 million violent crimes were committed in the United States. But his own data shows
that, of those 1.7 million violent crimes, just over 105,000—or just 6% of the total—involved
murder or rape. The remaining 94% (1.6 million of the 1.7 million) of the violent crimes
comprised armed robbery, aggravated assault, and “other” crimes (this latter category alone
accounting for 330,000 crimes, more than 3 times as many as the rapes and murders)—the
types that might be serious, but also can be and often are much less threatening. LAUDAN,
supra note 1, at 48 tbl. 4.
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cannot be said of wrongful convictions.
Professor Laudan predicts a different preference for most people,
asking rhetorically, “After all, how many of us would say that they would
prefer to have been murdered rather than having been sentenced to 12 years
in prison for a murder we didn’t commit? Who would rather have been raped
with violence than have been falsely convicted of rape and receiving the
average 6-year sentence for that crime?”117 But Professor Laudan can only
make that argument by focusing on the most violent types of crimes—
particularly murders and “violent rapes.” For many of those crimes,
Professor Laudan is likely correct. For less serious violent crimes, including
armed robbery and aggravated assault, Professor Laudan then suggests the
picture is not much different because he says that 38% of armed robberies
and 30% of aggravated assaults resulted in serious injuries.118 Yet, as noted,
murders compose only a miniscule proportion of all crime in America, and
rapes not much more119—even less if limited to the more physically injurious
types of assaults that Professor Laudan apparently means by “violent rapes.”
And even the “serious injuries” he references among the armed robbery and
aggravated assault cases will often, if not usually, be the type of injury from
which one can recover. Indeed, Professor Laudan’s data show that, by far,
the most significant reason that most violent crimes do not produce
convictions is because the victims don’t even bother to report them. Of the
1.7 million violent crimes he counts in 2008, about half of the crimes were
never reported to police.120 Apparently, for a huge proportion of violent
crime victims, the experience, for whatever reason, didn’t warrant a call to
the police. The costs between all of these crimes and wrongful convictions
cannot be simplistically counted as equal.
Professor Laudan suggests that the costs of false convictions are further
diminished because “a non-trivial number of those false positives will be
exonerated by the activities of Innocence Projects and by exoneration
hearings.”121 Because he estimates a false conviction rate of about 3%, he
contends that “approximately 2-3% of convictions for violent crimes lead to
exonerations for false positives, meaning release from prison”122 But even
if Professor Laudan’s false conviction rate is correct, that is a theoretical or
estimated rate, not a rate at which innocent people are actually exonerated.
117

LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 74.
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 75.
119
According to the FBI, in 2013, of more than 9 million total arrests in the United States,
8,383, or 0.0009%, were for murder, and 13,515, or 0.001%, were for sexual assaults of all
types. FBI Crim. Just. Info. Servs. Div., Crime in the United States 2013, FBI (2013), https://
ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-43.
120
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 49, 67.
121
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 75.
122
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 75.
118
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Only a small fraction of the pool of individuals hypothesized to be innocent
are actually exonerated each year; most of the innocents continue to languish
in prison, unable to muster the combination of new evidence, legal
assistance, access to a court, and simple good luck required for vindication.
Professor Laudan’s argument, equating the theoretical false conviction rate
with the exoneration rate, reinforces both the weakness of his claims and
Professor Risinger’s observation that Professors Laudan’s (and Allen’s) data
“seem to have been selected to make their readership . . . feel more
threatened, so those readers will be more open to their message.”123
It seems quite likely, therefore, that the harm caused by the average
false conviction is much more significant than the harm caused by the
average false acquittal. Of course, the opposite could also be true, at least
for some offenses, although I doubt for most. But even if one is unconvinced
about the greater harms from wrongful conviction, the point remains, at
bottom we just don’t know with any certainty—and how could we, since the
harms involved defy quantification? Hence, it is overly simplistic, and
indeed futile, to try to create a mathematical formula for quantifying harms
that are as widespread, divergent, individualized, and unknowable as the
harms from false convictions and false acquittals. But what we can be pretty
sure of is that there is no reason to assume the harms fit a neat ratio of 1 to
1.124 That alone dooms Professor Laudan’s enterprise.
C. Balancing Harms Against Individual Justice
Professor Laudan’s approach flounders for another, related reason as
well. He attempts a mathematical balancing of harms in the aggregate, and
then from there hopes to settle on a burden of proof that will apply in
individual cases. But justice as dispensed in the courts, especially in criminal
courts, is about fairness to the individual litigants. In this sense, Professor
Laudan’s mathematical approach proves far too much, for, if pushed to its
logical extreme, it would generate scenarios in which aggregate risks for
certain categories of individuals might be deemed so serious (in terms of
risks of false acquittals) as to warrant putting the burden of proof on the
accused, and even making it a high burden.125 But, despite the risk that the
123

Risinger, Tragic Consequences, supra note 32, at 1016.
Professor Cassell, in his contribution to this Symposium, suggests that, because of
these uncertainties, I just “throw up” my hands. Cassell, infra note 207, at 1478. But my
response is not to despair in the way Professor Cassell suggests. Instead, as discussed infra
Part VI, my response is to focus on what we can know, and how that can lead us to improve
the overall functioning of the system, to simultaneously reduce failures to convict the guilty
and false conviction of the innocent. My response, I believe, is one that is simultaneously
reality-based and more attentive to reform possibilities that can actually make the system
better.
125
Professor Risinger has also previously recognized this problem: “[B]y the[] logic [of
124
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community may perceive from some unpopular individuals, justice requires
considering individual guilt, not some form of group liability (even if based
on individual characteristics, like prior offenses). Professor Corrado makes
this point this way:
[Settling on a burden of proof] is a matter of costs, but the standard
(at least in the courtroom) does not involve comparing costs. It
does not involve comparing the cost of a guilty verdict with the
cost of a not guilty verdict, for example. In the case of punishment,
there is a prior determination, namely that the individual is not to
be sacrificed merely for the good of the community, and that
something more is required. That is, the state is not being asked
to show that in general the costs of a mistaken verdict of not guilty
vastly outweigh the costs of a mistaken guilty verdict. Instead,
given the immense cost for the defendant of a guilty verdict,
mistaken or not, and the moral presumption that human beings are
not to be used by the state without justification, the only
comparison is between the evidence for guilt and the evidence
against guilt. Were it otherwise, we would run into the most
extreme form of the problem that punishing the innocent raises for
the justification of punishment: if the costs of a verdict of not
guilty were in general too high, the burden would be on the—
possibly innocent—defendant to prove his innocence, and the
burden might be set quite high, ensuring that innocent defendants
could be sacrificed to the good of the community.126
In a related way, when comparing harms at the individual case level—
the level at which justice is dispensed—there is still another reason why false
convictions are far worse than false acquittals. Every false conviction is
guaranteed to inflict substantial harm on an individual; the harm to the
innocent individual is by its very nature a certainty, a given. But the harms—
as measured by Professor Laudan (by which he means future victimization
of innocent people) from false acquittals in individual cases are speculative
at best. While Professor Laudan claims that on average a factually guilty
person who is acquitted will commit 1.2 additional crimes, even if accurate
and meaningful, that is an average. It is far from certain that any given
factually-guilty-but-acquitted individual will commit any additional crimes
at all (while, of course, he or she might commit many). To reiterate, then,
when dispensing justice to individuals, the harm from wrongly convicting an
Allen and Laudan’s] position, there would seem to be no limit to the drop in the standard of
proof that could be justified, all the way to the preponderance, and even beyond . . . .”
Risinger, Tragic Consequences, supra note 32, at 1018.
126
Corrado, supra note 34, at 4.
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innocent person is certain, but the harm to other potential crime victims from
acquitting a factually guilty person is speculative and contingent.127 From a
justice perspective, the two harms simply cannot be equated.
V. TILTING AN ALREADY TILTED PLAYING FIELD
A. Targeting Recidivists, Exacerbating Mass Incarceration
As noted, ultimately Professor Laudan’s argument boils down to this:
We don’t incarcerate enough people, or for long enough, at least when it
comes to violent crimes. At numerous points he makes this claim directly.128
It is difficult, however, to reconcile that diagnosis and its ensuing
prescription for more and longer imprisonment with the well-known facts.
To begin, the United States already has the highest incarceration rate in the
world—and it’s not even close. The incarceration rate in the United States
is seven times the rate of its Western European counterparts.129 And
incarceration in the United States over the past few decades has exploded,
leading to what is widely now recognized as a crisis of mass incarceration130
in a system already “internationally infamous for its size and harshness.”131
From 1977 to 2010, the number of individuals in state and federal prisons
mushroomed from approximately 300,000 to more than 1.5 million.132 Yet
we are not appreciably safer for it, especially in an international comparative
sense.
127
I recognize that there are other harms one might attribute to a false acquittal, such as
the failure to deliver a sense of justice to the victim of the given crime. I do not mean to
diminish those concerns, but do not count them in my analysis simply because Professor
Laudan does not attempt to quantify such harms in his equation (how could he?), and it is his
equation to which I am responding.
128
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at ix (arguing that it is wrong to believe “[t]he near-universal
belief that we are incarcerating far too many criminals—a familiar cliché of modern American
life” or “[t]he widely-held convention that we are locking serious criminals away in prison
for unreasonably long stays”); LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 25 (arguing that “there are effective
methods for lowering the rate of serious crimes. Basically, these hinge on convicting and
incarcerating a higher proportion of the guilty than we now convict.”) (emphasis in original);
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 31 (“Where violent crimes are concerned, we should be
incarcerating more of the guilty and locking them away in prison for longer venues.”).
129
Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality and the Future of
Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 857 (2009); Alfred Blumstein et al., CrossNational Measures of Punitiveness, 33 CRIME & JUST. 347, 348–50 (2005).
130
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012); MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: HOW TO
REDUCE CRIME AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2005).
131
NATAPOFF, supra note 112, at 1.
132
Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1016–17 (2013) (first citing LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2010
3 tbl. 1 (2011); then citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE AND
FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1925–85 3 tbl. 2 (1986)).
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While it can be hazardous to draw causal conclusions from comparative
data, especially given the vast array of cultural, economic, political, and
other differences that can contribute to crime rates, comparisons between
demographically, culturally, and politically very similar states within the
United States can be somewhat illuminating. Wisconsin and Minnesota, for
example, are often compared because of their many similarities. That
comparison suggests, at least to some extent, that more and longer
imprisonment does not produce greater public safety, as promised by
Professor Laudan. Although the two states have nearly identical populations
(approximately 5 million), and very similar demographics, geography, and
cultures, Wisconsin imprisons two to 2.5 times as many people as does
Minnesota: in 2008, Wisconsin had 23,000 people in its prisons, while
Minnesota imprisoned only 9,000.133 Yet crime rates in the two states are
nearly identical.134 Somehow, the reduction in crime that Professor Laudan
promises from increased imprisonment has not materialized in
Wisconsin135—despite the considerable human and financial cost to the state
from that increased imprisonment.
Lowering the burden of proof for repeat offenders is also not even
necessary to achieve Professor Laudan’s goal of making it easier to imprison
recidivists. Common investigative heuristics, adjudicative practices,
institutional imbalances, and the rules of evidence already take care of that.
For the same reason that Professor Laudan wants to target repeat offenders,
police and prosecutors are already predisposed to suspect the usual
suspects—whether as a matter of convenience or motivation. Repeat
offenders are the people on police radar screens. Police and prosecutors
naturally target repeat players because they are the people whose
fingerprints, DNA profiles, and mug photos are already available to link
them—accurately or not—to crimes.136 Indeed, Professor Laudan and his
frequent co-author Ronald Allen have previously recognized that prior

133

MICHAEL O’HEAR, WISCONSIN SENTENCING IN THE TOUGH-ON CRIME ERA: HOW
JUDGES RETAINED POWER AND WHY MASS INCARCERATION HAPPENED ANYWAY 62, 89, 160–
61 (2017); Comparison of Wisconsin, Minnesota Prison Data Prompts Questions, TWIN
CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.twincities.com/2010/04/28/comparisonof-wisconsin-minnesota-prison-data-prompts-questions/ (updated Nov. 12, 2015).
134
Id.
135
See O’HEAR, supra note 133, at 160 (concluding Wisconsin and Minnesota data
“suggest[] that Wisconsin’s dramatic divergence from Minnesota on the imprisonment front
after the 1970s may have yielded few public safety benefits”).
136
For eyewitness identification procedures, for example, Gary Wells has explained how
simply being included ins a photo array or lineup puts innocent people at risk of
misidentification. See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reform, 2006 WIS.
L. REV. 615, 635 (2006). Individuals with prior records are, of course, much more likely to
have mug photos that are available for inclusion in photo arrays, or to be selected for inclusion
in an identification procedure, simply because of the prior record.
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record is already one of the strongest predictors of conviction that is
available, regardless of whether the jury hears about the prior conviction or
not; those without a prior conviction are about twice as likely to be acquitted
as those with a prior record.137
Beyond convenience, Professors Laudan and Allen have also
previously hypothesized that one reason people with prior records are
convicted at higher rates than those without “can be explained by the fact
that police and prosecutors are keener on locking up serial felons”—and
hence work harder to develop evidence against them.138 Empirical data
supports this intuition. The research on false confessions, for example,
reveals that when police approach a suspect with a belief in guilt—a scenario
that is more likely when the suspect has a prior record—they are more likely
to engage in aggressive psychological interrogation tactics that make it much
more likely that the suspect—whether guilty or innocent—will confess, will
do so in convincing detail, and will appear guilty to observers.139
Similar heuristics influence jury decision-making as well, predisposing
juries to find guilt if the defendant has a prior record, even when they are
ostensibly applying the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Although the
rules of evidence preclude the jury from hearing about prior records for some
accused individuals—precisely because the rules recognize that the biasing
heuristics can lead juries to convict not on the evidence but on assumptions
that the accused is a bad person and hence for that reason is either likely
guilty or is deserving of punishment whether he committed the particular
crime at issue140—the rules also permit evidence of prior records to be
admitted at trial under many circumstances.141 Despite rules ostensibly
barring evidence of prior conduct to prove character or propensity, the rules
permit evidence of other acts if offered to prove virtually anything other than
137

Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence
and Other Mythos of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY. 493, 498
(2011) (citing Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation and Data About the Acquitted,
42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1190 (2005)).
138
Id. at 517.
139
See, e.g., Deborah Davis & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of Interrogation-Induced
False Confession: Sources of Failure in Prevention and Detection, HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC
SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 47 (2013); Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions:
Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215 (2005), https://www.iiir
g.org/assets/Kassin-2005-Does-Innocence-Put-Innocents-at-Risk.pdf.
140
The Advisory Committee notes to FED. R. EVID. 404 explain the rationale for
excluding character evidence: “Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be
very prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually
happened on the particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man
to punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the
case shows actually happened.” FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note to 2000
amendment (quoting Cal. Law Revision Comm’n, Rep., Rec. & Studies, 615 (1964)).
141
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b); FED. R. EVID. 609.
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character—such as “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident,” and the like.142
Courts have read those exceptions so expansively in criminal cases that they
have nearly swallowed the rule.143 If the defendant testifies, the rules then
generally permit impeachment with prior convictions. The result is either
the defendant suffers the prejudice attendant to spreading her bad character
before the jury,144 or she refrains from exercising her right to testify and
explain her innocence in order to prevent such impeachment.145 Either way,
the defendant’s opportunities for vindication are diminished.146
Other systemic factors also conspire against repeat players. Those with
a prior record are less likely to be granted bail, for example, or if granted
bail, are likely to have it set too high for them to be able to post it. Yet we
know that inability to make bail impedes one’s ability to work with counsel
to prepare a defense, make reparations to victims, or address treatment needs,
thereby increasing the odds of conviction and/or the severity of

142

FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 576 N.W.2d 30, 33–34 (Wis. 1998) (noting that the court
of appeals in that case had “expressed concern that the supreme court and the court of appeals
over the years have chipped away” at the rule against admitting other acts evidence); Ronald
J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof: Probability as a Tool in Plausible Reasoning, 21
INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 133, 140 (2017) (noting that, despite rules that purport to exclude
other acts evidence, most such character evidence is admitted at trial, as in practice “virtually
all relevant evidence comes in”).
144
Considerable empirical research confirms that use of prior record to impeach a
testifying defendant imposes a penalty on criminal defendants, and has a tendency to lead
jurors to convict for legally impermissible character reasons. For an excellent summary of
this research, see Jeffrey Bellin, The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395 (2018).
Interestingly, in the literature on this point, the lone noteworthy article that makes the contrary
claim—that the empirical evidence on this point is “all over the map,” and that the priorrecord penalty is overstated—is authored by Professors Laudan and Allen. See Allen &
Laudan, supra note 2. Professor Bellin, however, convincingly shows that the data Laudan
and Allen rely upon to reach their startling conclusion is inapposite or distinguishable and
that, accordingly, despite Laudan and Allen’s contrary claim, “[t]he empirical evidence from
mock juror experiments is one-sided and clear. The studies suggest that the introduction of
prior conviction evidence substantially damages defendants’ chances for acquittal, primarily
through a legally prohibited ‘criminal propensity’ inference.” Bellin, supra note 144, at 406
(footnote omitted).
145
See Bellin, supra note 144, at 146 (summarizing the social science literature showing
that jurors punish defendants for declining to testify). Professors Laudan & Allen also
hypothesize that jurors likely infer a prior record whenever the defendant fails to introduce
evidence of no prior convictions, and that this helps explain why jurors convict repeat
offenders at a higher rate than those with clean records. Allen & Laudan, supra note 2, at
511–15. If correct, this adds even more reason why a prior record already works as a handicap
to the repeat players, without officially lowering the burden of proof.
146
In an interesting simulation study, Professor Bellin found that, not only do jurors
punish defendants for either having a prior record (the “prior offender penalty”) or for
choosing not to testify (the “silence penalty”), but that the penalties are approximately equal.
Bellin, supra note 144, at 415.
143
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punishment.147 (Inability to make bail also has other negative consequences,
even for those who are ultimately acquitted, including loss of jobs, housing,
benefits, and placement of children and even increased recidivism.)148
A prior record, therefore, inherently serves as a handicap in our
criminal justice system, without any help from Professor Laudan’s proposal
to tilt the scales even further. Professor Laudan’s proposal—to deliberately
stack the deck against those with prior convictions—thus promises to further
imbalance the process and make it significantly more likely that innocent
defendants with prior records are wrongly convicted.
Data from the exoneration cases seems to bear out this reasoning. Of
the more-than 2,000 exonerees listed in the National Registry of
exonerations, approximately 44% have some sort of prior record.149 Yet
among the general population, a smaller proportion, approximately onethird, have a prior record150—itself a staggeringly high figure on an
international scale, but significantly lower than the rate among those who are
wrongly convicted in the United States. Thus, the data reveal that, while
wrongful conviction can happen to anyone, those with a prior record are at a
significantly higher risk of suffering such an injustice; the rate of exoneration
is almost 50% higher for those with a criminal record than for those
147
See Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of InterestBalancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 517 (1986); Liana M. Goff,
Pricing Justice: The Wasteful Enterprise of America’s Bail System, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 881,
900 (2017) (“Being [denied bail] increases the likelihood that individuals will commit future
crimes, substantially impacts defendants’ ability to assist attorneys in mounting competent
defenses, and encourages plea bargains, all of which increase the likelihood that the accused
will be convicted, imprisoned, and subjected to an extended deprivation of liberty and justice
as a sentenced inmate.”) (citing MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC.,
A DECADE OF BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 115 (2012) (“[A] decade of criminal cases
were analyzed, revealing that in New York City, 50% of bailed nonfelony defendants were
convicted, compared with 92% of those jailed pending trial. Among those convicted, only
10% of the bailed defendants received prison sentences, compared with 84% of defendants
who spent the entire pretrial period behind bars.”)); Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan
Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L.
REV. 711 (2017); Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1130 (2005) (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.2(c) (2d ed. 1999) (“There is little reason to doubt the proposition
that pretrial detention has a significant adverse impact upon the ability of a defendant to
vindicate himself at trial.”)); CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 527–28 (4th ed. 2000) (stating that bail “facilitates preparation of a defense and
prevents incarceration of a possibly innocent person”).
148
Jeffrey A. Kremers, Milwaukee Moves Away From Money Bail System, WIS. LAWYER,
(June 2017), http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx
?Volume=90&Issue=6&ArticleID=25667.
149
Email from Maurice Possley to author (on file with author).
150
Half in Ten & The Sentencing Project, Americans with Criminal Records (2015),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Americans-with-CriminalRecords-Poverty-and-Opportunity-Profile.pdf.
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without.151
And, of course, all of this is especially true with regard to the poor, the
mentally ill, and racial minorities. It is well-known that “[c]ommunities of
color; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals; and people with
histories of abuse or mental illness are disproportionately affected” by the
criminal justice system.152 Because these groups—already ensnared in the
criminal justice system at disproportionate rates—will therefore also be even
more over-represented among those who are wrongly convicted,153 Professor
Laudan’s proposal has the additional consequence of exacerbating these very
problematic disparities in the criminal justice system.154 I need not recount
the myriad ways that those disparities undermine respect for the law, create
tensions between the system (including most visibly the police) and
communities of color, and destabilize whole communities. This adds yet
another reason why Professor Laudan’s simple equation overlooks many of
the intangible and uncountable harms attributable to wrongful convictions.
It also underscores Professor Zalman’s observation that “[a] startling
omission in the anti-Blackstonians’ analyses is race. In their highly abstract
world not only are human actors like unchanging monads but they are
colorless.”155
B. Tilting the Procedural Rules at Trial
When cases go to trial, the rules of the game can further make
exoneration of the innocent difficult. In this regard, Professor Laudan has it
exactly backwards when he contends that “[l]egislators and appellate courts
over the years have made it increasingly difficult to identify guilty
defendants” by essentially stacking the deck at trial in the defendant’s
favor.156 Among the rules that Professor Laudan argues give the defendant
an advantage (and obscure the truth) are rules that exclude: the fruits of
Fourth Amendment violations;157 the defendant’s prior record;158 “‘unfairly
151

Id.
Id.
153
Again, the data from the wrongful conviction cases bear this out. Among the first 200
DNA exonerations, 62% were black, and a combined 71% were black or Hispanic (compared
to 29% for whites)—well beyond their proportion of either the general population or even the
prison population. Garrett, supra note 55, at 66.
154
New empirical research shows that indeed the massive increase in imprisonment rates
from 1978 through 1999 produced a huge and disproportionate increase in the incarceration
rate for black people. Walter Enders, Paul Pecorino & Anne-Charlotte Souto, Racial Disarity
in U.S. Imprisonment Across States and Over Time (Oct. 13, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3053020.
155
Zalman, supra note 104.
156
LAUDAN, supra note 1.
157
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 113.
158
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 114.
152
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prejudicial, relevant evidence;”159 “relevant, hearsay evidence;”160 evidence
about the character of the defendant;161 non-Mirandized confessions;162
evidence that the defendant refused to talk with the police after they had
advised him that he had the right to remain silent;163 and privileged evidence
(statements from “doctors, clergy, psychiatrists, lawyers, social workers,
counselors”).164 Among the procedural asymmetries that Professor Laudan
says favor the defendant are the bar against the prosecution’s appeal of
acquittals;165 the sequence at trial, which permits the defendant “to present
his case and his testimony after the prosecution rests its case . . . thereby
being able to shape his testimony to his advantage;”166 rules that permit the
defendant to “present character evidence to impeach prosecution witnesses
while still blocking the admissibility of evidence of his own character (if he
does not testify);”167 the statute of limitations that bars initiation of a case
after a certain period of time;168 asymmetry in the parties’ discovery
obligations and rights;169 rules that permit the exclusion of eyewitness
identification evidence that in some jurisdictions have become more
amenable to excluding evidence than in the past;170 and others. Professor
Laudan also notes that there are some features of the criminal process that
favor the prosecution—including the prosecution’s far greater resources,
discretion in shaping the charges, ability to make deals with accomplices or
grant immunity for testimony, and the defendant’s inability to compel
victims (or any witness for that matter) to agree to a pretrial interview.171
But he gives these advantages little ink, and concludes, curiously, that they
pale in comparison to defense advantages.

159

LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 114 (citing FED. R. EVID. 403).
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 114.
161
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 114.
162
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 115. Professor Laudan also curiously argues, without citing
authority, “A voluntary admission of guilt by the defendant to the police (even after being
Mirandized) can be retracted by the defendant, thereby becoming inadmissible at trial, unless
there is independent evidence corroborating the confession.” LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 115.
Why Professor Laudan says this is a mystery. Certainly a defendant may retract a confession,
but that hardly makes the confession inadmissible. Such confessions are routinely admitted
at trial, both as substantive evidence of guilt and as impeachment of the defendant’s testimony
should he or she take the stand and proclaim innocence.
163
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 115 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)).
164
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 115.
165
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 116.
166
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 116.
167
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 117 (citing FED. R. EVID. 608).
168
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 117.
169
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 117.
170
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 117.
171
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 119–20.
160
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So much is wrong here it’s hard to know where to start, and I only have
space to address some of the problems. Professor Laudan is certainly correct
that exclusionary rules, although only rarely invoked successfully, favor the
defense and have a truth-suppressing effect. Professor Laudan ignores,
however, that the system has adopted those rules fully aware that they have
those effects, but has created them nonetheless because they serve values
entirely independent of the truth-seeking functions of the trial, such as
protecting the privacy rights of all citizens, guilty or innocent. One can
debate the wisdom, and effect, of those rules, but it is not a part of the tradeoff between protecting the innocent from wrongful convictions and the
potential future victims of guilty-but-acquitted individuals. It is a different
debate altogether. A similar analysis applies to exclusion of statements
obtained in violation of Miranda (although some such exclusions might
actually enhance reliability because unwarned confessions—especially
coerced ones—might be more likely to be untrue than others).
Most of the other rules or procedures Professor Laudan cites either are
neutral (not defense-favoring), or exist precisely because the rules-makers
have concluded that they will enhance, not diminish, access to the truth—
and therefore they are designed to serve both conviction of the guilty and
acquittal of the innocent. Some that Professor Laudan cites even actually
favor the prosecutor, not the defense. Rules against character evidence and
prior acts evidence, hearsay, unfairly prejudicial evidence (Rule 403), and
privileges, for the most part apply equally to both parties and all witnesses.
Professor Laudan’s claim that the fact that the prosecutor presents her case
first advantages the defense is puzzling, at best. And the hearsay rules, the
rules against character and other acts evidence, and against unfairly
prejudicial evidence, are designed to keep out evidence that impedes access
to the truth—that is, precisely in order to enhance reliability of the
proceedings for all parties, and thereby to reduce both false positives and
false negatives.
Some of the features that Professor Laudan criticizes as too defense
friendly actually operate in the opposite way. Allowing the prosecution to go
first is among those. The principle of primacy and recency teaches that the
most influential and memorable evidence is usually that which is heard first
and last.172 By going first, the prosecutor gets to take advantage of that
principle, and moreover gets to shape the narrative for the rest of the trial.173
172
See, e.g., James L. Farr, Response Requirements and Primacy-Recency Effects in a
Simulated Selection Interview, 57 J. APP. PSYCH. 228 (1973); James L. Farr & C. Michael
York, Amount of Information and Primacy-Recency Effects in Recruitment Decisions, 28
PERSONNEL PSYCH. 233 (1975); Norman Miller & Donald T. Campbell, Recency and Primacy
in Persuasion as a Function of the Timing of Speeches and Measurements, 59 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCH. 1 (1959).
173
Much of Professor Laudan’s concern with the sequence at trial is that the defendant
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Moreover, although Professor Laudan wholly overlooks it, the prosecutor
also gets to go last—the prosecutor is permitted to present a rebuttal case
whenever the defense presents anything unanticipated. In closing arguments,
as in the evidentiary portions of the trial, the prosecutor also gets to present
both first and last, while the defense gets to argue only once with no
opportunity to respond to what the prosecutor says in rebuttal. Most
knowledgeable litigators would vastly prefer the opportunity to go both first
and last in presenting evidence and arguing; this is no advantage to the
defense, but a distinct advantage to the prosecution.
In other ways, the rules Professor Laudan cites distinctly disadvantage
the accused. Professor Laudan claims, for example, that, “in trials where the
defendant chooses not to testify, the trial judge will exclude the admission of
prior crimes evidence in about 90% of the cases involving serial felons.”174
Most scholars, however, note that the rule against admission of prior crimes
evidence—which only prohibits use of alleged prior misconduct to prove an
individual’s bad character or propensity to commit like crimes—is so riddled
with exceptions and loose judicial interpretation that it rarely poses much of
an obstacle to admission.175 Indeed, Professor Laudan’s sometimes-coauthor Ronald Allen has acknowledged, specifically with regard to such
character evidence, that, “[a]lthough the American rules of evidence are
often characterised in other countries as having many exclusionary rules, the
gets to listen to all the other witnesses’ testimonies before testifying, while all other witnesses
are typically sequestered. Professor Laudan overlooks, however, that the prosecution too gets
to exempt one of its key witnesses from sequestration orders; the lead case investigator is
often permitted to remain at the prosecutor’s side throughout the trial, exempted from
sequestration, able to listen to the other testimony in the trial before testifying—and even able
to listen to the defendant’s testimony (if he testifies)—before testifying in rebuttal.
174
LAUDAN, supra, note 1, at 17 (citing Professors Allen and Laudan on prior
convictions).
175
See, e.g., Demetria D. Frank, The Proof Is in the Prejudice: Implicit Racial Bias,
Uncharged Act Evidence & the Colorblind Courtroom, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST.
1, 3 (2016) (“court decisions resolving Rule 404(b) issues have been quite liberal in sustaining
theories of admissibility advanced by prosecutors, despite the fact that such admission often
violates the prohibition on the use of character evidence to prove conforming conduct.”);
Bruce D. Landrum, Military Rule of Evidence 404(b): Toothless Giant of the Evidence World,
150 MIL. L. REV. 271, 271 (1995) (“Rule 404(b) is probably the most frequently litigated rule
of evidence. Yet, the evidence that it excludes actually falls within a very narrow range.”);
Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on Character
Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 184 (“Contrary to . . . [the]
conventional view, courts routinely admit bad acts evidence precisely for its relevance to
defendant’s propensity.”); David A. Sonenshein, The Misuse of Rule 404(b) on the Issue of
Intent in the Federal Courts, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 215, 219 (2011) (“In the last fifteen to
twenty years . . . many federal courts have reversed their views and now generally take a
welcoming or inclusionary approach to admission of prior similar acts for the purpose of
showing intent.”); Glen Weissenberger, Making Sense of Extrinsic Act Evidence: Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b), 70 IOWA L. REV. 579, 579 (1985) (observing that prosecutors “will
almost always succeed” in attempts to admit uncharged acts against criminal defendants).
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truth is the exact opposite: virtually all relevant evidence comes in”176
Recently, both the Federal Rules of Evidence and many state evidence codes
have taken this trend a step further and have explicitly abolished the rule
against using evidence of prior sexual assaults or child molestations (whether
the defendant was convicted or not) to prove guilt in a new sexual assault177
or child molestation178 case. In this regard, these particular types of criminal
defendants are singled out for a disadvantage that applies to no other litigant
in any type of case, plaintiff or defendant, government or accused, civil or
criminal. And of course, as noted, the Rules of Evidence permit evidence of
prior convictions to be admitted to impeach a defendant if she exercises her
constitutional right to testify in her own defense.179 It blinks at reality to
suggest that most evidence of prior alleged bad acts (let alone prior
convictions) is hidden from juries.
Moreover, Professor Laudan wholly overlooks other trial and
evidentiary rules that distinctly favor the prosecution. The direct connection
doctrine, or its variants, for example, directly impedes the defendant’s ability
to introduce relevant evidence of innocence in the form of evidence that
some other party committed the crime.180 As I have explained it previously,
Third-party perpetrator evidence is not admissible in most
jurisdictions merely if it is relevant. Rather, under the direct
connection doctrine, the evidence must be both relevant in the
traditional sense (i.e., it must have a “tendency” to make the
defendant’s guilt “less probable”), and it must have a “direct
connection” to the crime. The rule frequently excludes evidence
of strong motive or opportunity because courts often require
“direct evidence placing the third party at the scene.” Because this
rule imposes a super-relevancy requirement on the defendant’s
ability to tell her story of innocence, it is hard to reconcile the rule
with a professed overriding concern for protecting the innocent.181
176

Allen, supra note 143, at 140.
See FED. R. EVID. 413(a) (“In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of a
sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual
assault. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.”).
178
See FED. R. EVID. 414(a) (“In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child
molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other child
molestation. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.”).
179
FED. R. EVID. 609.
180
Different jurisdictions use various terminology to describe the direct connection
requirement, including “clearly link,” “point directly,” “point unerringly,” “inherent
tendency,” or “legitimate tendency,” but all essentially have the same effect. See Findley &
Scott, supra note 71, at 343 n.337.
181
Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the
Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 925–26 (2008) (footnotes omitted). See also
David S. Schwartz & Chelsea B. Metcalf, Disfavored Third-Party Guilt Evidence, 2016 WIS.
177
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Similarly, several of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay explicitly
or in practice uniquely restrict defense-proffered evidence. The rules, for
example, create a hearsay exception for statements against penal interest if
the declarant was unavailable at the time of trial.182 But one type of
statement-against-interest testimony is uniquely disfavored: evidence
proffered by a criminal defendant to show that someone else might have
committed the crime. Rule 804 provides: “A statement tending to expose
the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.”183 The rule does not similarly burden such
evidence when offered by the prosecution in a criminal case, or when offered
by any party in a civil action. Again, such skewing of admissibility standards
is hard to reconcile with an overriding commitment to protecting the
innocent, or with Professor Laudan’s claim that the hearsay rule somehow
favors the defense.
The hearsay rules are also applied in other ways that favor the
prosecution. Eleanor Swift has shown that courts apply disparate standards
of admissibility for “contextual” evidence offered to complete the narratives
presented by the parties to exclude defendants’ statements about their thenexisting state of mind (another hearsay exception), even though such
evidence should be admissible under Rule 803(3), and even though it may
be critical context information needed to make a defendant’s narrative
complete and plausible.184
And it is by now well known that when it comes to admitting forensic
science evidence, the courts perform their gate-keeping role under Rule
702185 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,186 in uneven ways
that disadvantage the defense and fail to ensure reliability of the evidence
used to convict. Empirical data on judicial decisions on such expert
testimony reveal that non-validated, unscientific forensic “science”

L. REV. 337, 337 (2016) (arguing that the direct connection doctrines’ disfavored treatment of
third-party guilt evidence “stems from discredited and abandoned concepts of evidence law
and is out of step with the Federal Rules of Evidence and modern evidence codes. The direct
connection doctrines wrongly transfer credibility questions from the jury to the judge and
raise only minimal FRE 403-type dangers to justify their systematic exclusion. Moreover,
the direct connection doctrines unconstitutionally interfere with the defendant’s right to
present a complete defense. They lack any non-arbitrary justification.”).
182
See FED. R. EVID. 804(a), 804(b)(3).
183
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
184
Eleanor Swift, Narrative Theory, FRE 803(3), and Criminal Defendants’ Post-Crime
State of Mind Hearsay, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 975 (2008).
185
FED. R. EVID. 702.
186
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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evidence187 proffered by the prosecution is routinely admitted, while defense
expert evidence, even well researched and validated evidence (such as expert
testimony on eyewitness identifications188), is routinely excluded.189
C. The Pretrial Case-Building Stage
Professor Laudan’s contention that the rules of the game favor criminal
defendants—flawed as it is—focuses almost exclusively on the rules that
govern trials. Yet trials are the rare exception; almost all criminal law is
adjudicated without a trial. As noted, more than 95% of all convictions are
obtained not after a trial, but by plea.190 We have essentially an
administrative system of criminal justice, in which state administrators—
police and prosecutors working together—develop the evidence and
determine the outcomes, which are usually formally processed in guilty or
no contest plea proceedings.191 Hence, in most cases, the defendant’s fate is
sealed long before trial (or the guilty plea hearing)—when the evidence is
created, collected and packaged.
To overlook that stage of the process, then, is to overlook the real
machinery of the criminal justice system. When one does examine that part
of the process, the picture that emerges is entirely inconsistent with Professor
Laudan’s thesis that the system is hopelessly tilted in favor of the accused.
While Professor Laudan acknowledges that the state typically has superior
resources and greater access to the evidence, he underestimates the
significance of these advantages. At these pretrial, case-development stages,
the state has a virtual monopoly on the process. Police typically have sole
access to the crime scene and the crime scene evidence, which the defense
can only later access through the notoriously limited and weak discovery
provisions in criminal cases. Pretrial detention adds to the defendant’s
limited ability to conduct an independent investigation. Police can threaten
187
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter NRC
REPORT].
188
See Findley, supra note 181, at 922–24.
189
See Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions
Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2003); Findley, supra note
181, at 939–43; Garrett, supra note 55, at 76, 81; Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s
“Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1071, 1076 (2003); Jennifer L. Groscup
et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal
Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 342 (2002), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.o
rg/b386/f5131178d3e5f916698f62e83837c2587043.pdf; Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near)
Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH S107 (2005); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 143–49 (2000).
190
See MOTIVANS, supra note 94, at STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl. 4.2.
191
See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117 (1998).
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and lie to suspects and witnesses to induce cooperation and statements, and
prosecutors can compel testimony in grand juries, while the defendant can
do neither. Prosecutors can offer benefits (lenient treatment, immunity, even
cash) in return for testimony—conduct that would be a crime for any other
litigant192 And police and prosecutors have their own crime laboratories.193
As Ion Meyn has observed, “[t]he irony is apparent. A criminal defendant
has more constitutional protections than any litigant during trial, but all other
litigants have far greater access to information and have a greater ability to
test evidence during the pretrial period, where over 90% of all disputes are
actually resolved.”194
VI. TOWARD HARM REDUCTION WITHOUT INCREASING WRONGS
Professor Laudan contends:
We have to remind ourselves of two features of the data collection
system that guarantees that we miss many recidivist acts. I refer,
of course, to the fact that, where violent crimes are concerned, a).
only about 45% of crimes are reported to the police, b). the police
arrest and charge only about 30% of the violent offenders. That
all means that c). there are some 1.2m violent crimes committed
every year in which the police never identify the culprit. It is
inconceivable that most of those unsolved crimes were not
perpetrated by serial felons who escaped arrest or conviction. If
that is so (and I cannot imagine otherwise), we have to recognize
that the recidivist harms caused by serial felons are much greater
192
See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that
the government alone has the legal right to “give[], offer[], or promise[] anything of value to
any person, for or because of testimony,” even though such conduct by any other litigant
would constitute the crime of bribery).
193
For a discussion of these and other advantages that the government enjoys in
developing and investigating the evidence that determines case outcomes, see Findley, supra
note 181, at 898–907.
194
Ion Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39,
46–47 (2014). And that power—to develop the facts that become the reality of the case—is
awesome. Meyn puts it this way: “The executive wields impressive pre-complaint
investigatory powers. Free from judicial review, this inquiry will remain largely shielded
from defendant’s eyes. State agents are authorized to search, seize, arrest, and interrogate
both willing and unwilling witnesses. The investigative method of an officer summarizing
his findings in a police report lacks any transparency. This lack of transparency permits the
opportunity to dissimulate information. Any later attempt to correct the record will involve a
police officer’s word against the account of the witness. State agents thus exercise “formal”
(the power to compel) investigatory powers that produce a non-transparent factual record
largely insulated from later review. This opportunity is not afforded to any other litigant in
the common law system.” Id. at 49 (footnotes omitted); see also Ion Meyn, Discovery and
Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091 (2014)
(arguing that structural deficits in the criminal justice system impede the defense from
conducting adequate investigations).
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still than I have described them.195
These data are indeed significant—but primarily for a different reason
than Professor Laudan posits. What these data show is that most crimes go
unpunished not because of failure to prove guilt under the reasonable doubt
standard. Most crimes go unpunished because they are never reported to
police or police never apprehend a suspect. “Beyond a reasonable doubt”
has nothing to do with that. If the concern is to prevent future harms from
recidivist behavior, our efforts would be much better spent addressing the
conditions that produce crime and the reasons police fail to solve such a high
proportion of crimes. More investigative resources would do far more for
public safety than tinkering with the burden of proof and thereby running the
risk of exacerbating what is already emerging as a serious problem of
wrongful conviction of the innocent.
Professor Laudan, however, does not seriously consider other ways of
dealing with crime than to ratchet up conviction rates and sentence lengths,
along with false convictions. Professor Laudan thinks almost exclusively in
terms of trade-offs between public safety and protection of the innocent, and
he comes down on the side of public safety. Professors Laudan and Allen,
for example, write that “the remedies usually proposed for the ‘excessive’
levels of false conviction involve measures that further increase the already
grave risk of criminal victimization.”196 That, however, does not reflect the
real thrusts of the innocence movement, as we shall see.
But first I must acknowledge that some scholars and advocates, to be
sure, have urged dramatic reforms of the criminal justice system to provide
greater protections against conviction of the innocent, some of which would
reduce accurate convictions. Recently, for example, in SAFETY FROM FALSE
CONFESSIONS Boaz Sangero systematically analyzed known wrongful
convictions and advocated a series of reforms.197 In addition to the standard
reforms innocence organizations typically endorse to respond to the
“canonical list”198 of factors that contribute to wrongful convictions (e.g.,
improving eyewitness identification procedures, electronically recording
interrogations, improving the scientific foundations of the forensic
“sciences,” etc.), Professor Sangero advocates broad structural reforms, such
as prohibiting convictions based on a single piece of evidence,199 making the

195
196
197
198

Laudan, supra note 1252 (footnote omitted).
Allen & Laudan, supra note 2, at 80.
SANGERO, supra note 81.
See Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 186

(2008).
199

SANGERO, supra note 81, at 57–64.
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“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard even more demanding,200 prohibiting
conviction based on a confession absent strong corroboration and evidence
that the interrogee knew unrevealed details about the crime,201 and the like.
Some of those reforms would involve trade-offs (hence I will call them
“trade-off reforms”)—reducing the rate of false positives through reforms
that increase the rate of false negatives. Critics have argued, therefore, that
their viability and justifiability are dependent on showing both a high rate of
false convictions and that the high rate of false convictions is
disproportionately caused by the systemic features he proposes to alter. And,
those critics contend, such data are just not there to make those claims.
Doron Menashe and Sivan Biber, for example, criticize Professor
Sangero’s trade-off reforms, contending “it seems hard to substantiate a
whole safety theory on such meager empirical data, no matter how good the
extrapolation methods are [for estimating that data].”202 And, they add, the
reform theories that Professor Sangero relies upon “cannot be tested for
refutability because the relevant data is ‘hidden,’ and so it does not adhere to
Karl Popper’s principle of falsifiability.”203 Accordingly, they contend,
“[e]ven from a moral point of view it’s questionable if we should take safety
measures to prevent hypothetical ‘accidents,’ while those measures will
certainly and very tangibly harm other important moral values, like the right
to personal security.”204
If that is true for reforms designed to prevent false convictions, like
Professor Sangero’s, then it is certainly true—indeed even more so, given
the relative dearth of data on false acquittals—for reforms designed to
prevent false acquittals, like those offered by Professor Laudan and his
fellow anti-Blackstonians. All of Professor Laudan’s reforms—most
prominently the recommendation to lower the burden of proof in some
cases—are explicitly trade-off reforms. Indeed, they are intended to be such.
Professor Laudan’s whole goal is to imprison more people, and to do so by
reducing the number or proportion of people who are acquitted (defined
broadly to include dismissals), including of necessity a percentage that are
actually innocent. While Professor Laudan works hard to extrapolate both a
false conviction and a false conviction rate in order to justify this change, the
reality is those rates are mere guesses—quite debatable guesses at that—and
hence no basis for making fundamental alterations of our structures affecting

200

SANGERO, supra note 81, at 65–66.
SANGERO, supra note 81, at 95.
202
Doron Menashe & Sivan Biber, Safety from False Convictions by Boaz Sangero—
Book Review, J. JURIS. 147, 154 (2017).
203
Id. (citing KARL POPPER CONJUNCTURES AND REFUTATIONS—THE GROWN OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 33–58 (5th ed. 1989)).
204
Menashe & Biber, supra note 202, at 154.
201
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fundamental rights, like the burden of proof, that were deliberately created
to reflect the value preferences of our system. The consequences would
surely be unknown, likely to some extent at least unintended, and perhaps
disastrous.
To Professor Laudan, the interests in protecting the innocent and
convicting the guilty, like the trade-off reforms that Professors Menashe and
Biber criticize, are always in tension; pursue one, and you suffer losses to
the other. In Professor Laudan’s binary world:
If we say to ourselves (as many jurists and legal scholars do) that
we must take new and additional measures to minimize the
likelihood of a false positive, then we are apt to try to modify the
legal system by a variety of additional rules that make it even
harder than it now is for the prosecutor to establish the guilt of a
defendant. (Indeed, that is a quick thumbnail summary of the
history of Supreme Court jurisprudence about criminal law in the
last half century.)205
Professor Laudan reiterates: “We know full well that the greater the
pains a state takes to protect its innocent citizens from false conviction, the
more difficult it is for the state to control crime, since measures adopted to
achieve the former end will typically make it more difficult to convict the
guilty, which in turn . . . make controlling crime much more difficult.”206
To the contrary, however, most of the reforms that innocence
organizations advocate are not trade-off reforms, but “win-win reforms,” or
at least what we might call “no-loss reforms”—they reduce the rate of false
convictions by improving the diagnostic capacities of the system, not by
putting a thumb on one side of the scales of justice.207 Indeed, despite their
criticisms of Professor Sangero’s trade-off reforms, Professors Menashe and
Biber acknowledge that

205

LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 15.
LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 23.
207
It is worth noting that Paul Cassell, another of Zalman’s “anti-Blackstonians,” unlike
Professor Laudan, recognizes the possibility of no-loss reforms. See Paul G. Cassell, Can We
Protect the Innocent Without Freeing the Guilty? Thoughts on Innocence Reforms that Avoid
Harmful Trade-offs, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION 264 (Daniel S.
Medwed ed. 2017). Interestingly, though, most of Cassell’s no-loss reforms adhere to his
crime-control orientation in that they include, among others, abolishing the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, overruling Miranda (and simultaneously requiring electronic
recording of custodial interrogations), and requiring all defense attorneys to ask their clients
if they committed the crime. Id. at 274–80. Some of these might have some effect on
mitigating wrongful convictions, but others likely would not, for reasons that are beyond the
scope of what I can explore here.
206
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other “safety measures” offered by Sangero, like improving police
lineup identification protocol or recording lineups on video—
which will give the court a direct, full documentation of the
evidence—will provide fact-finders better information about the
nature of the specific eyewitness testimony laid before them,
while leaving them full discretion about the weight of that piece
of evidence and the ability to convict upon it. Under those
restraints Sangero’s theory can truly be considered a win-win
improvement to evidence law.208
Professors Menashe and Biber also include reforming forensic sciences
to improve their scientific validity as another type of win-win reform.209
In his now-classic summary of the reforms, Sam Gross described the
standard list of innocence-based reforms as follows:
There is a canonical list of factors that lead to false convictions:
eyewitness misidentification; false confession; misleading, false,
or fraudulent forensic evidence; testimony by highly motivated
police informants such as “jailhouse snitches;” perjury in general;
prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective legal defense. All these
factors are common among cases of known exonerations.210
For reasons I have previously articulated in detail, most fixes for almost
all of these error points are no-loss reforms, not trade-off reforms; they
almost universally strive to improve the reliability of the system without
forcing dramatic trade-offs.211 I will not cover that ground again here, except
to address one—eyewitness identification reform—because Professor
Laudan identifies it, I believe misleadingly, as a trade-off reform.212
The most widely discussed of the core innocence reforms is to improve
the way police collect eyewitness identification evidence (and related
reforms, such as admitting expert testimony so jurors are better equipped to
rationally evaluate eyewitness evidence). The range of reforms typically
includes ensuring non-suggestive construction of lineups and photo arrays
with appropriate fillers; instructing witnesses that the true perpetrator might
or might not be present, so that witnesses do not feel compelled to pick
someone even if the real perpetrator is not present; using a detective to run
the procedure who does not know who the suspect is (or otherwise “blinding”
208

Menashe & Biber, supra note 202, at 156 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 151–52.
210
Gross, supra note 198, at 186.
211
Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm for Criminal Justice: How the Innocence
Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133 (2008).
212
See LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 129–32.
209
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the detective) so that the detective cannot even unwittingly cue the witnesses
(so-called “double-blind” administration); including only one witness per
identification procedure; conducting only one identification procedure per
witness; and promptly assessing the eyewitness’s level of confidence, before
the witness is given any confirming or disconfirming feedback.213 The social
science research literature on these reforms is extensive, and confirms that
they are indeed no-loss, if not win-win reforms.
In his book, however, Professor Laudan, hones in on just one of the
reforms that has been widely discussed, and argues that it threatens to cause
a loss of factually correct convictions. That additional reform is the
recommendation, adopted in some jurisdictions, that police present fillers
and suspects in a photo array or lineup to the witness sequentially rather than
simultaneously, as has been done traditionally.214 Professor Laudan’s point
is that this is a classic trade-off reform because, while it does reduce mistaken
identification, it also reduces accurate identifications. There is, indeed, some
evidence from laboratory studies suggesting that the sequential procedure
does have this general suppressing effect, reducing both mistaken and
accurate picks.215 But Professor Laudan’s treatment of this issue is both
incomplete and misleading, for three reasons.
First, as noted, this is only one of the many reforms innocence
advocates have advanced for improving eyewitness evidence, and the others
do not involve this type of trade-off, and it is the one that those reformers
recommend least often. Given that there is legitimate laboratory data
suggesting a trade-off for the sequential procedure, innocence advocates
usually make note of the sequential procedure, but do not necessarily
advocate it; they instead advise policy makers that they need to consider the
possible trade-offs for themselves and decide what policy they want to
pursue. The Innocence Project—the flagship innocence organization—for
example, lists the following on its web site as the key reform elements: (1)
“The ‘Double-blind’ Procedure/Use of a Blind Administrator;” (2)
“Instructions That the Suspect May Not be Present;” (3) “Composing the
Lineup [So That All Fillers Match the Description of the Perpetrator;]” (4)
“[Prompt Recording of] Confidence Statements;” and (5) “The Lineup
Procedure Should Be Documented.”216 The sequential procedure is not
213

For a fuller summary of the standard eyewitness identification reforms, see Keith A.
Findley, Implementing the Lessons from Wrongful Convictions: An Empirical Analysis of
Eyewitness Identification Reform Strategies, 81 MO. L. REV. 377, 386–400 (2016).
214
See LAUDAN, supra note 1, at 129–32.
215
See, e.g., Nancy M. Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and
Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
459, 468 (2001).
216
Eyewitness Identification Reform: Mistaken Identifications are the Leading Factor In
Wrongful Convictions, INNOCENCE PROJECT (2017), https://www.innocenceproject.org/eyewi
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among them. This, alone, belies Professor Laudan’s claim that innocence
reformers “are apparently wedded to the idea that any measure that reduces
the false conviction rate is to be preferred over its rival(s), no matter what
the cost paid in lost true convictions may be.”217
Second, Professor Laudan’s argument is misleading because of the way
he presents the data from the laboratory studies. It is true, as he reports, that
in the laboratory the sequential procedure reduces both mistaken and
accurate identifications. But Professor Laudan wholly ignores that the
reason some advocates push for the sequential, and some policy makers
(including many police departments) choose it, nonetheless, is because its
diagnosticity ratio—that is, the ratio of accurate picks to mistakes—is
dramatically improved with the sequential procedure. The meta-analytic
data reveal that, in laboratory studies, accurate identifications are reduced
from about 50% to about 35%. But mistaken identifications of innocent
suspects are reduced even more dramatically, from 27% to 9%.218 That
translates into a dramatic increase in the diagnosticity ratio from 1.85 (0.50 /
0.27) for the simultaneous procedure to 3.89 (0.35/0.09) for the sequential
procedure.219 In other words, with the sequential procedure the overall rate
of picking may be lower, but when witnesses do pick, they are much more
likely to be correct.
Third, and finally, Professor Laudan ignores field research, as opposed
to laboratory research, that shows that in actual case work the sequential
procedure reduces the rate that witnesses pick innocent fillers (known
mistakes), but does not produce any drop-off in the rate of suspect picks.220
The most prominent field study—the best real-world data we have—
suggests that the sequential procedure might be not a trade-off reform at all,
but indeed a no-loss reform. Nonetheless, despite Professor Laudan’s
indictment that innocence reformers do not care about trade-off costs, the
Innocence Project, out of an abundance of caution, has reserved judgment on
the sequential procedure.
In a short prior article Professor Laudan has also criticized other aspects
of the eyewitness-identification-reform agenda, most notably the
recommendation that witnesses should be given “unbiased” instructions
(informing the witness that the real perpetrator might or might not be
present), and the preference for lineup or photo array procedures over

tness-identification-reform/.
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LAUDAN, supra note 1.
218
Steblay, supra note 215, at 463; Wells, supra note 136, at 627.
219
See Wells, supra note 136, at 627.
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Gary L. Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo-Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses: An
Experimental Test of a Sequential Versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39 Law & HUM.
BEHAV. 1 (2015).
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showups (one-on-one identification confrontations on the street between a
witness and a single suspect).221 Those criticisms, however, are hard to
reconcile with serious concern about the search for the truth. To complain
about “unbiased” witness instructions is akin to complaining about rules that
prohibit police from telling the witness which lineup member to pick because
it reduces the rate at which witnesses pick the suspect. If it reduces
conviction rates—and the research actually shows that unbiased instructions
in fact improve reliability without any appreciable reduction in accurate
picks222—then it does so only by preventing the police from cheating, and
by ensuring that the evidence is actually real evidence.
Contrary to Professor Laudan’s criticisms, the preference for lineups
over show-ups also is well supported by the research as a no-loss or even
win-win reform.223 Moreover, Professor Laudan entirely overlooks that one
reason show-ups are so much more dangerous to the search for the truth is
because in a target-present lineup,224 when a witness makes a mistake and
picks a filler, usually no harm is done, because police know the witness has
erred. No one goes to prison wrongly for it. But in a show-up, where there
are no fillers, when a witness makes a mistaken identification, that mistake
will always incriminate an innocent person whom police will then pursue
and prosecute. Professor Laudan pays no heed to these real-world concerns,
and the reasons why the eyewitness identification reforms are indeed at least
no-loss reforms.
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Larry Laudan, Eyewitness Identifications: One More Lesson on the Costs of Excluding
Relevant Evidence, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 272 (2012).
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Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions
and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482, 486–87 (1981).
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Steven E. Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform:
Psychological Science and Public Policy, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 238, 244 (2012) (noting
that while some eyewitness identification reforms might cause some drop-off in correct
identifications, lineups are superior to showups both in terms of reduced misidentifications
and increased accurate identifications); Dawn J. Dekle et al., Children as Witnesses: A
Comparison of Lineup Versus Showup Identification Methods, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (1996) (discussing the risk of false positive identifications when showup
procedures are used with children); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Simultaneous Lineups, Sequential
Lineups, and Showups: Eyewitness Identification Decisions of Adults and Children, 21 LAW
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That is, a lineup that includes the suspect, as is typically the case in real-world police
lineups.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The point of all this is, in the end, regardless of the rate of false
convictions or false acquittals, we can all agree that the system can do better.
But because the data about comparative rates of false positives and false
negatives and about how to assess the comparative harms from each simply
are not there, and do not appear to be reliably ascertainable, looking first for
dramatic trade-off reforms is the wrong place to start. As I have previously
written:
[O]nce the rate of wrongful convictions rises above the trivial
level—and the evidence convincingly tells us that is now so—then
we need not identify a precise rate of error to recognize the need
for action. The question then becomes not so much how many
wrongful convictions there are, but whether we can do anything
to reduce the rate of error. Any wrongful convictions are too many
if they can be avoided without imposing too much strain on the
system. In this sense, as one prosecutor at a conference on
preventing wrongful convictions asserted, the question is not one
of how many innocents are wrongly convicted, but simply
whether we can do better. Are there best practices that can be
implemented to reduce that number, whatever it is?
In this sense, the issue can be analogized to public transportation
disasters, such as airplane crashes. The rate of airline crashes is
minuscule; in 2007, the airline industry experienced only one fatal
accident in about every 4.5 million departures. Nonetheless, we
continue to take airline crashes very seriously, and do all we can
to reduce the accident rate as much as possible.
The rate of wrongful conviction is clearly much higher than that
of airline crashes. And, like airline safety, there is much we can
do to improve the reliability of the criminal justice system. The
imperative is there, then, to learn about and implement the best
practices that can make the system function more reliably. . . . “225
Professor Laudan reminds us that the same can be said about false
negatives. But, just as with false convictions, that is most immediately and
appropriately understood as a call for reforms to improve the overall
functioning of the system, not to tilt the scales and trade one set of harms for
another. And there is much we can do in that regard by studying what
actually works for preventing recidivism; by increasing resources for police,
225

Findley, supra note 72, at 1172–73.

FINDLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

1318

8/10/2018 9:44 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1265

prosecutors, and defense counsel for the indigent (because in an adversary
system, robust defense counsel is a critical component in the process of
ensuring accurate and full discovery and evaluation of the facts); by
improving relations between police and low-income or minority
communities so that they are more likely to trust them and report crimes; and
the list goes on. But what we should not do is abandon fundamental
principles like the reasonable doubt standard that so thoroughly reflect who
we are as a society, and thereby inevitably create a sad and wholly
unnecessary trade-off—sacrificing even more innocent people to make the
rest of us feel marginally safer.

